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Abstract 
Explaining the Failure ofPolitical Liberalization in the 
Persian Gulf and Assessing the Prospects for Democratization: 
The Case of Bahrain 
This thesis addresses the applicability to the study of Persian Gulf regimes of the pre-
eminent theories within the study of democratization: modemization, political culture and 
transitology. The thesis begins with a conceptual discussion of democracy in order to establish 
the recognized minimal standard within the literature for a successful democratic transition. We 
examine the modemization and political culture approaches and determine that they provide 
inadequate explanations for the endurance of authoritarian regimes in the region. 
We then tum to an analysis of the theory of transitology, the dominant paradigm in the 
study of democratization. We argue that despite having been used sparingly within the context of 
Middle Eastern studies, it represents the most comprehensive theoretical framework through 
which to analyse political liberalization in Arab states. We find that the failure of previous 
liberalization processes in the region can be eXplained by the absence of circumstances within 
the regimes to meet the three main tenets of transitology: advanced liberalization, a schism 
within the ruling elite between soft-liners and hard-liners and political pacting between regime 
soft-liners and a moderate opposition. The thesis also emphasizes the flexible nature of 
monarchies as a regime-type. We argue that the institutional suppleness and adaptability of 
monarchies makes them receptive to transitology-styled incremental top-down democratization, 
as evidenced by the historical precedent of European constitutional monarchies. We find that this 
precedent is related to the ability of monarchies to reform without jeopardizing the status of 
elites within their respective societies. As a result, the scope of the thesis is limited to the Persian 
Gulf States since they are the only monarchies in the Middle East, with the exception of 
Morocco and Jordan and therefore represent the likeliest candidates for successful 
democratization. 
To validate these conclusions, we apply the three different paradigms to the case study of 
Bahrain, a Gulf monarchy which is in the midst of a substantialliberalization process. This study 
is supplemented by a complementary analysis of the neighbouring states of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia in order to better contextualize Bahraini liberalization within the Gulf region. This is 
preceded by a historical account of political reforms in each state. We find that the social, 
economic and cultural prerequisites for democracy stipulated by the modemization and political 
culture paradigms have been satisfied in the cases of Bahrain and Kuwait for sorne time and 
therefore do not account for the persistence of the respective monarchies. In the case of Saudi 
Arabia the modemization and political culture approaches are applicable as the country has yet to 
experience a significant transformation of social and cultural values. When analyzed through the 
prism of transitology we find that the theory is applicable to aIl three cases. In Kuwait, advanced 
liberalization and a moderate opposition are present but the schism within the ruling elite, the 
genesis of the transition process according to transitology, is absent. In Saudi Arabia, we find 
none of the three tenets of transitology have been satisfied. Finally, in the case of Bahrain we 
find that the recent momentum for liberalization has coincided with the emergence of a schism 
within the ruling elite which has shown itself willing to negotiate with the mature moderate 
opposition which pre-dates independence in 1971. We therefore conc1ude that democratization is 
attainable in Bahrain and that transitolob'Y constitutes a useful paradigm for democratization 
theorists wishing to study political liberalization in the Gulf region and other Arab states. 
Key Words: Democratization, Transitology, Bahrain, Persian Gulf, Monarchy, Modemization, Political Culture, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
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Résumé 
Ce mémoire porte sur l'applicabilité des trois théories prédominantes de la démocratisation -la 
théorie de la modernisation, l'approche culturelle et la transitologie - à l'analyse des régimes 
politiques de trois pays du Golfe Persique. Dans un premier temps, nous discutons du concept de 
démocratie, afin d'identifier les critères minimaux d'une transition démocratique réussie dans la 
littérature. Dans un deuxième temps, nous examinons les raisons pour lesquelles la théorie de la 
modernisation et l'approche culturelle ne pennettent pas d'expliquer adéquatement la persistance des 
régimes autoritaires dans la région. 
Par la suite nous analysons la théorie de la transitologie, actuel paradigme dominant des 
études sur la démocratisation des sociétés. Nous soutenons qu'elle constitue le cadre d'analyse le 
plus approprié pour éclairer les succès et les limites de la libéralisation dans les pays arabes, 
nonobstant le fait qu'elle ait été peu utilisée par les travaux sur la démocratisation au Moyen-Orient. 
Selon nous, les échecs des processus de démocratisation amorcés dans le passé au sein de cette 
région sont attribuables à l'absence des trois conditions identifiées par la transitologie : une 
libéralisation du régime, l'existence d'un conflit entre les élites conservatrices et réfonnistes du 
régime, la présence d'une opposition loyale ouverte à la négociation d'un compromis politique avec 
·les dirigeants réfonnistes. 
Le mémoire insiste également sur la flexibilité des régimes monarchiques du Golfe. Nous 
soutenons que la souplesse institutionnelle et l'adaptabilité des monarchies les rend réceptives à des 
scénarios de démocratisation par le haut comme le montrent les précédents historiques de certaines 
monarchies constitutionnelles européennes, car elles peuvent procéder à des réf onnes en profondeur 
sans compromettre le statut des élites. Cette hypothèse explique que le mémoire soit centré sur les 
pays du Golfe Persique, qui sont les seuls États monarchiques du Moyen-Orient à l'exception de la 
Jordanie et le Maroc et dès lors, les plus probables candidats à des transitions démocratiques réussies. 
Afin de confinner ces hypothèses, nous analysons le cas du Bahreïn, une monarchie du Golfe 
engagée dans un processus substantiel de libéralisation, à l'aide des trois théories mentionnées. Nous 
complétons cette étude par l'examen de la situation politique dans deux monarchies voisines - le 
Kuwait et l'Arabie saoudite - afin de mieux situer la libéralisation au Bahreïn dans le contexte 
régional. Le rappel de l'histoire des réf onnes politiques effectuées dans ces deux pays montrent que 
les pré-requis socio-économiques et culturels identifiés par la théorie de la modernisation et 
l'approche culturelle ont existé pendant une certaine période de temps, de telle sorte qu'ils ne 
peuvent expliquer la persistance de l'autoritarisme dans les deux États. La théorie de la transitologie 
par contre pennet d'éclairer la trajectoire différente des trois pays de l'échantillon. Au Kuwait, c'est 
l'absence d'un conflit entre conservateurs et modérés du régime, et non l'absence d'une libéralisation 
et d'une opposition loyale qui explique l'échec de la démocratisation. En Arabie Saoudite, la 
résilience du régime autoritaire est dûe à l'absence des trois variables de la transitologie. Au Bahreïn, 
la récente libéralisation est attribuable à un schisme au sein du régime entre conservateurs et 
réfonnistes et à la volonté de ces derniers de négocier des réf onnes avec les forces modérées d'une 
opposition remontant à la période antérieure à l'indépendance de 1971. Nous concluons, sur la base 
de ces études de cas, que la transitologie est un paradigme utile pour comprendre les avancées ou les 
limites de la libéralisation politique dans la région du Golf persique et les autres pays arabes. 
Mots clés: démocratisation, transitologie, Bahreïn, Golf Persique, monarchie, modernisation, approche 
culturelle, Koweït, Arabie Saoudite 
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Explaining the Failure ofPolitical Liberalization in the Persian Gulf and 
Assessing the Prospects for Democratization: 
The Case of Bahrain 
Introduction 
Transitology occupies a dominant position within the study of democratization. It has 
been used sparingly in the context of the Middle East because of the absence of any successful 
democratic transitions in the region. The failure of previous liberalization pro cesses in the region 
however can be explained applying the theory' s emphasis on elite conflict and pacting. In the 
case of Bahrain, the goveming style of the Al Khalifa, dynastic rulers of the Kingdom, was once 
described as "driving with the brakes full-on and having an olfactory insensitiveness to the 
results".1 It was therefore a surprising development wh en in 1999 the new Emir, Sheikh Hamad 
bin Isa Al Khalifa extended an olive branch to the opposition, releasing all political prisoners, 
allowing the retum of exiles and lifting restrictions on the press. A traditionally autocratic and 
repressive state, the recent political developments in the Gulf state would have been 
inconceivable five years earlier when Bahrain plunged into a state of chaos as a result of civil 
unrest. 
lronically, the circumstances which provoked the uprising had been the steadfast refusaI 
ofSheikh Hamad's father, then monarch, to implement any political reforms. Instead he chose to 
deal with demands for greater participation by imprisoning or exiling those who advocated su ch 
refofffi. Until his death, Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa had been the only ruler of Bahrain and 
Sheikh Hamad's arrivaI marked the dawn of a new political era in Bahrain. 
The Emir's gestures appear to have been motivated by a desire to retum stability to 
Bahrain and led to the opening of a dialogue with the opposition and the implementation of a 
1 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United A rab 
Emirates and Oman, (Reading: Gamet Publishing Limited, 1998),80 
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series of sweeping refonns. Basic civil rights such as the freedom of speech were granted to 
Bahraini citizens. Later that year, a national Charter was adopted, restoring parliamentarianism 
to Bahrain, absent since its first attempt at liberalization failed in 1975 and its national Assembly 
was dissolved. Universal suffrage was introduced and several parliamentary elections have since 
been held. In addition, Sheikh Hamad has made efforts to reconcile the relationship between the 
Al Khalifa and the Shi'i majority which had historically been subjected to systemic 
discrimination.2 They amended the previously draconian security law and appointed two Shi'i to 
the cabinet for the first time in history. Bahrain has moved to the forefront of liberalization 
among Gulf States. 
In light of the foregoing events, this thesis will argue that the theory of transitology 
provides reasonable cause to predict that liberalization in Bahrain will lead to democratization 
and thereby overcome the obstacles which have historically doomed earlier transitions in Arab 
states. 
The discussion in the first chapter begins with a conceptual definition of democracy. This 
is followed by an analysis of the three leading theoretical paradigms of democratization within 
the context of the Middle East: modemization, political culture and transitology. Following a 
critique of both the modemization and political culture paradigms and their shortcomings, the 
discussion shifts to the applicability of transitology within the context of the Middle East, in 
particular its usefulness in understanding past failed and/or aborted liberalizations and the 
absence of democracy in the region. From this in-depth analysis we single out the theory of 
transitology's three most important elements of a successful democratic transition: a schism 
within the ruling elite between hard-liners and soft-liners, an advanced liberalization process, and 
a moderate opposition with whom regime soft-liners can negotiate a political pact which will 
2 The rule regarding the use ofShi'i and Shi'a: Shi'a refers to the collective or community (ex. The Bahraini Shi'a 
or the Shi'a ofBahrain). Shi'i refers to a member of the community and is also used as an adjective (ex. A number 
of Shi'i Bahrainis). 
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fonn the basis of the new political order. Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis will evaluate the political 
refonns of Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the basis of the satisfaction of these three 
tenets. 
In the second chapter, we discuss the prevalence of monarchies as a regime-type in the 
Gulf States despite their virtual disappearance in the rest of the world. Drawing from arguments 
advanced by Joseph Kostiner, Lisa Anderson, Michael Herb and Greg Gause III, we detennine 
that institutional flexibility, cohesion with the ruling elite and vast patronage networks, upheld 
by substantial oil revenues, account for the resilience of dynastic monarchies in the Persian Gulf. 
We subsequently examine how these regime characteristics lend themselves to top-down graduaI 
refonn and the preservation of elites, both of which make them more apt to democratization 
according to transitology. This assertion is supported by historical precedent in which 
monarchies make the transition to constitutional monarchies. 
In the third chapter, we focus on the case-study of Bahrain and evaluate its recent 
liberalization and political refonns. We begin by retracing the rise to power of Bahrain's ruling 
dynastic family, the Al Khalifa, from its nomadic tribal origins to the consolidation of its rule 
over a majority Shi'i population through a close alliance with the British. This is followed by an 
overview of the rapid modemization of the state and its infrastructure following the discoveryof 
oil in Bahrain We provide an historical account of Bahrain's opposition movement and its 
demands for greater political participation and refonns noting that it has culminated into a united 
non-sectarian pro-democratic front. The final segment evaluates the recent political 
developments In Bahrain through the pnsm of transitology and detennines whether or not 
Bahrain satisfies the three main tenets. This analysis leads to a favourable and optimistic outlook 
for an eventual democratic transition in the Kingdom of Bahrain. 
The fourth and final chapter examines Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and compares their 
regime's responses to greater demands for political action, the character of their opposition 
10 
movements and the strength of their dynastic ruling elite to those of Bahrain. As Gulf States, 
both countries share several characteristics with Bahrain including relatively short political 
histories, small and sparsely populated terri tories in relation to global standards, a large foreign 
worker population, oil-based economies and most importantly, dynastic monarchy regimes, aIl 
factors which assist our comparison. Like Bahrain, Kuwait has undergone significant political 
reform. It possesses an elected legislative body, basic civil rights, such as the right to public 
assembly and freedom of the press, as weIl as universal suffrage for Kuwaiti citizens. Saudi 
Arabia, on the other hand, represents the most totalitarian and unyielding Gulf State. Its reforms 
have been minimal, dissent is forbidden, repression is widespread and civil rights are virtually 
non-existent. The contrasting example of Saudi Arabia allows us to gain a more significant 
perspective through which to view the level ofpolitical reform in Bahrain and Kuwait. We end 
the chapter's discussion by situating other Gulf States in between these two extreme examples of 
regime responses to public discontent and demands for modified rights of political participation. 
A successful democratic transition in Bahrain could have substantial regional 
ramifications and alter the character and scope of liberalization in the region. More importantly, 
it could grant regional relevance to the theory of transitology, a paradigm which, despite its 
hegemonic position within the broader general context of democratization studies, has been 
sparsely used in discussions of political reform in the Middle East. 
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Chapter 1: Research Question, Methodology and Theoretical 
Framework 
1.1 Research Question and Methodology 
Since 1999, Bahrain has undergone significant political refonn. In a relatively short 
period of time it has evolved from a repressive state to a liberalized autocracy where citizens 
enjoy basic civil rights including freedom of speech and freedom of the press. In addition, it has 
witnessed the reappearance of parliamentarianism with the creation of a newly elected legislative 
assembly. Elections have been accessible to aIl citizens. 
This thesis discusses whether the theory of transitology represents a better model through 
which to analyse the successes, limits and failures of political liberalization in Bahrain, Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia than the theory of modemization and the political culture approach. Our 
hypothesis is that the theory of transitology is the paradigm best suited to assess political 
liberalization in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and its prospects for eventual 
democratization. This question is supplemented by a secondary inquiry which considers whether 
the regime type of the monarchy is particularly pre-disposed to democratization. 
The refonns in Bahrain are evaluated through the theoretical paradigm of transitology. 
The paradigm, which places emphasis on the role of elites in democratization, has assumed a 
preeminent position within the study of democratization. The theory of transitology emphasizes 
three main elements of a successful democratic transition: a rupture within the ruling elite 
between hard-liners and soft-liners, the initiation of a liberalization process and the fonnation of 
a political pact through a negotiated compromise between regime soft-liners and moderate 
opposition leaders. A final additional postulate is that transitions are characterized by uncertainty 
and that there exists no fixed outcome. 
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The thesis first detennines the relevance of transitology to the Middle East. In the 
absence of any successful transitions to democracy we apply the theoretical framework to 
explain that their past transitions were unsuccessful since they failed to satisfy the theory's main 
tenets. We then apply the main postulates of transitology to the case study of Bahrain. Using 
deductive reasoning we sunnise that if Bahrain's political developments satisfy transitology's 
main postulates, it will therefore be more likely to successfully achieve democratization. 
Particular emphasis will also be placed on Bahrain's regime type, the dynastic monarchy, 
as being predisposed to democratization. This is based on the considerable historical precedent 
which exists for monarchies gradually making transitions to constitutional monarchies. The 
relationship between monarchies and democratic transitions will therefore be analyzed. 
The scope of the thesis will be limited to the Persian Gulf, where aIl but two of the Middle East' s 
monarchies are found. 3 
Other than regime type, the Persian Gulf States share many characteristics which will 
facilitate comparison. They are newly independent, sparsely populated, relatively wealthy states 
with modemized state bureaucracies, highly developed social infrastructures and oil-based 
economies. In addition to the case-study of Bahrain, we will consider two other Gulf State 
monarchies, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which have had to respond to public demands for 
liberalization and implementation of refonns. This discussion will serve to compare and contrast 
the application of the theoretical model oftransitology to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. 
The thesis adopts the nonnative stance that democracy is a univers al political concept 
which is both desirable and attainable to all states. The thesis will employ qualitative research 
methods. Research will be based solely on the use of secondary sources. This will not detract 
. from the usefulness of the study since the goal is to evaluate refonns in Bahrain by 
contextualizing it within the interpretive framework of transitology. This approach will allow us 
3 Morocco and Jordan are also ruled by dynastie monarchies. 
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to illuminate the strategies of political actors and detennine how they have been shaped by 
historical circumstances. 
The historical approach will be combined with a comparative approach. This will enable 
us to contextualize the political developments in Bahrain within the Gulf region and establish a 
qualitative assessment of the different approaches taken by the Gulf monarchies in response to 
public opposition and calls for increased political liberalization. The case-study subjects have 
been carefully selected to provide a representation of the wide spectrum of varying refonns in 
the region. Conclusions drawn from the case study of Bahrain will be useful in evaluating 
political realities of neighbouring states. 
The thesis contains a number of limitations of which we are fully aware. The most 
important limit is that the prognosis based on our evaluation of Bahrain's liberalization will not 
be definitive. Transitology emphasizes uncertainty and therefore our conclusions are based on a 
scale of probabilities which allow no more certainty than an optimistic outlook. Bahrain also is a 
small state. Its island status has somewhat disappeared since it is linked to the mainland by a 
causeway. Its territory is geographically limited and its population relatively small. However, 
Bahrain is more densely populated than its Gulf counterparts and when measured by global 
standards, the latter also have small territories and population. The small case-study sample 
limits the inferences which we can make about democratization in the Persian Gulf. Adeeper 
analysis and evaluation of political refonn in other Gulf States would allow stronger conclusions. 
Another limitation is the reliance on secondary sources. Primary sources could provide 
additional insight into the motivations and strategies of specific actors. Infonnation from high 
ranking members of the Al Khalifa family would be invaluable. However, ruling families are 
notoriously secretive and few researchers can claim to have tapped sources within the Al 
Khalifa's inner circle. The scope of the thesis however has been purposely narrowed down due to 
temporal, financial and institutionallimitations. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, the thesis will contribute to the study of democratization, 
a comerstone process within the study of contemporary politics. Democratization in the Middle 
East is especially significant given the ongoing hostilities throughout the region and its 
repercussions on foreign policy in both the United States and Europe. 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
Samuel Huntington has argued that the spread of democratization has evolved during 
concentrated periods which he refers to as "waves". The third wave, set in motion by the 
Portuguese transition to democracy in 1974, is noteworthy for its global reach.4 Today, the 
number ofdemocracies has tripled to encompass sixt Y percent of the world's govemments.5 Yet, 
the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, remains seemingly oblivious to the charms of 
democracy. It is perhaps for this reason that the region has been largely ignored by academics of 
democratization theory. 6 
The democratic deficit is often chalked up to the region's cultural incongruities, its failure 
. to modemize and its considerable oil revenues by proponents of the modemization and political 
culture paradigms. While these approaches shed sorne light on the persistence of 
authoritarianism in the region, none stands as an explanatory variable. Meanwhile, transitology, 
the dominant democratization paradigm first advanced by Dankwart Rustow and further refined 
by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, has been used sparingly to explain the 
persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East despite its apparent applicability.7 This chapter 
4 Samuel P. Huntington, "After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave", Journal ofDemocracy, Vol. 8, No. 4 
(1997),4 
5 Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Daniel Brumberg, eds., Islam and Demoeracy in the Middle East (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), ix and Samuel P. Huntington, "After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third 
Wave", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1997),4 
6Seymour Martin Lipset and Jason M. Lakin, The Democratie Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2004),4 
7 The ternI transitology is not used by G. O'Donnell and P. Schmitter themselves. It has however come to be used to 
describe their theory which has become "hegemonic" in the study of democratic transitions. Valerie Bunce, 
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argues that transitology's emphasis on regtme cnsls, elite pacts, democracy from above and 
uncertain outcomes pro vides the most convincing explanation for the absence of democracy in 
Arab states. The following thesis explores the relevance of transitology and the other 
predominant theories of democratization to the existing political realities of Arab states. The 
relative unit y within Middle East regimes, their control of the armed forces and the absence of a 
moderate opposition thus render the prospects for democratization bleak unless they emanate 
from a top-driven initiative. As is customary within the study of democratization, the analysis is 
preceded by a discussion of the key concept of democracy. 
1.2.1 Democracy 
A greater understanding of democracy is necessary to account for its absence within the 
Arab states of the Middle East.8 While there is an academic consensus that democracy is 
desirable, an objective definition remains problematic due to its "culturally and temporally" 
dependent context.9 The predominant definition of democracy is attributed to Joseph 
Schumpeter. It is best summarized by Seymour Martin Lispet as "an institutional arrangement in 
which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, 
for their chief executive and national legislature".lo The Schumpeterian definition emphasizes 
the role of competition or contestation as the main tenet of democracy. While Robert Dahl, 
Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl have sought to establish more precise criteria, the 
procedural minimum as defined by Schumpeter remains unchanged. Il The minimalist approach 
has been employed in most empirical democratization studies, most notably in Guillermo 
"Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations", Comparative Political Studies (Vol. 33, No. 6-7 
(September 2000), 721 
8 The use of the term 'Middle East' designates the states in the Middle East and North Africa 
9 Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratie Peace: Princip les for a Post-Cold War World. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), 15 
JO Lipset and Lakin, 19 
Il Schmitter and Karl put forth 9 criteria for democracy and attempt to incorporate conceptual and operational 
criteria. See Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy is ... and is Not", in Larry Diamond and 
Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence ofDemocracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993),45 
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O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter's Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and Adam 
Przeworski's Democracy and Development. 
For O'Donnell and Schmitter, democracy is based on the principle of citizenship. It 
implies a dual responsibility of the individual and the state. The individual must respect the 
equality of other individuals and their collective choices and the government becomes 
responsible for the well-being and rights of its citizens within the scope of its legally constrained 
authority. No existing institutional mode1 alone has a monopoly on democracy.12 The procedural 
minimum is in this case "secret balloting, universal aduit suffrage, regular e1ections, partisan 
competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability". I3 
Przeworski e1aborates more in-depth criteria regarding the competitive dimensions of the 
procedural minimum sine qua non for democratic regimes. In order for a regime to be considered 
democratic, both the executive and the legislative body must be directly or indirectly chosen 
through popular elections. These elected officiaIs must be only constrained by the electorate. 
Furthermore, the e1ection must feature an opposition which could hypothetically win. This 
ensures that it is possible that an incumbent could lose. The outcome of the e1ections istherefore 
somewhat uncertain beforehand. 14 The results of these e1ections must be honoured allowing the 
victors to assume their rightful place within government. Lastly, the results are temporary and 
e1ections must be held in the near future following the same criteria listed above. 15 
Electoral continuity is important because the e1ection of a government may in fact prove 
to be the establishment of a new authoritarian regime. Only through a repetition of the électoral 
process can doubts regarding the viability of the democracy be erased. In this vein, Przeworski's 
12Examples include majoritarianism, territorial representation, legislative sovereignty and popularly elected 
executives. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986),8 
13 Ibid., 8 
14 Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and 
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 16 
15 Ibid., 18 
17 
study of regimes therefore adds the additional criterion of alternation as a precaution. Until the 
incumbent party which originally cornes to power following a democratic transition loses an 
election, the regime cannot be characterized as democratic. 16 
While the Schumpeterian definition is used by many prominent democratization scholars, 
it has often been the subject of criticism. Laurence Whitehead's critique of the minimalist 
approach is perhaps the most interesting. According to Whitehead, the procedural definition is 
simultaneously too demanding and too inclusive. 17 Requisites such as universal suffrage and the 
unconstrained authority of a popularly elected political executive would periodically exclude 
long-standing democracies su ch as the United States and the United Kingdom. 18 More 
importantly, the emphasis on the minimalist definition is criticized for its narrow scope which 
ignores the social dimension of democracy.19 The oversight however is intentionaL Social and 
economic aspects are left out to avoid bias and comparisons with Western standards.zo Seymour 
Martin Lipset and Jason Lakin argue that expanding the definition of democracy to include 
"liberal" values can embroil the study of democratization in an endless debate over which values 
are most cruciaL "The point of democracy is to leave outcomes to the electoral process" and 
while features such as judicial review and accountability may be advantageous, they are 
characteristic of more 'complex' democracies.2INevertheless, Lipset includes both the freedom 
of expression and association to his minimal definition of democracy. 
The decision to excIude basic personal freedoms however can cause one to question the 
appeal of democracy. Does the absence of an independent judiciary not open the door to abuses 
16 Ibid. 
17 Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 13 
18 In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords veto on Parliament was only lifted with the 1911 Parliament Act. In 
the United States, universal suffrage was only codified by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
19 Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratie Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 58 
20 Przeworski, 33 
21 Lipset and Lakin, 22 and O'Donnell and Schmitter, 8 
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ofpower? After aIl, "the players of the game are not weIl situated to act as their own umpires".22 
Without minority rights, De TocqueviIle's tyranny of the majority can be played out within 
society.23 Can a society really be democratic where women have no rights or the press is not 
free? Whitehead, an adherent to the currently popular constructivist school of thought, provides 
an interesting answer. He argues that democracy, like many other political concepts, is a social 
construct. The difficulty of achieving a catch-aIl definition is a consequence of the "wide range 
ofhistorical, cultural and social contexts where it is being employed".24 
Rather than being set in stone, democracy is in a constant state of revision. Although the 
Schumpeterian-based definition may be prevalent today, further change and development may 
not be far off depending on the emergence of new circumstances. Indeed, the idea of democracy 
today is no longer the same as it was in Greek antiquity. Nonetheless, despite the fluctuating 
nature of democracy, the principle of citizenship remains at its core: the combination of 
individual consciousness and a belief in the building of shared values through deliberation.25 
Whitehead argues that the limits and boundaries of democracy are socially contested and 
determined by a "deliberative filter".26 Within a given cultural or historical context, the court of 
public opinion determines the democratic standard. Future attempts to alter the definition of the 
concept require the persuasion of citizens who remain the ultimate arbiters. 
So what is democracy? Whitehead acknowledges that while imperfect, by virtue of its 
predominance, the procedural definition characterizes the modem-day conception of democracy. 
It should thus serve as our basis for the study of democratization since in the "absence of an 
22 Shapiro, 64 
23 Susanne Karstedt "Democracy, Values, and Violence: Paradoxes, Tensions, and Comparative Advantages of 
Liberal Inclusion" The Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science, vol. 605, no. l, (May 
2006),58 
24 Whitehead, 7 
25 Ibid., 17 
26 Ibid., 22 
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agreed definition there can be no dialogue" within comparative politics?7 While Whitehead's 
reasoning may appear tedious, a critical assessment of our personal perspective is important 
when studying a contextually dependent concept such as democracy. 
Democratization studies in the field of comparative politics are often entrenched in a 
normative bias. Acknowledging this bias is important since our beliefs and assumptions 
influence our analysis of the object of study, in this case the Arab states of the Middle East. 28 
The globalization of democracy and its ability to reach remote locations has led sorne to label it a 
univers al concept.29 Huntington states that "democracy is good in itself ... and has positive 
consequences for individual freedom [and] domestic stability,,30. ln addition, democratic norms 
and institutions appear to create a "peace" among democratic states. The proliferation and 
consolidation of democracy would therefore "reduce the frequency of violent conflict and war" 
and lead to peaceful and negotiated settlements of disputes.31 
Since democracy's global reach has skipped the Middle East, with the exception ofIsrael, 
the region has thus been relatively ignored within democratization literature. Nevertheless, 
several arguments have been advanced by two closely related paradigms to explain the region's 
impermeability: the theory of modemization and the political culture approach. 
27 Ibid., 8 
28 Robert Cox with Michael G., Shechter, The Po/itical Economy of a Plural Word: Critical Reflections on Power, 
MoraIs and Civilization (London: Routledge, 2002), 28 
29 See Koti Annan, "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for Ali", March 2005, 
http://www.un.org/largerfreedomlcontents.htm. (December 4, 2006), 35 
30 Samuel P., Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991), xv 
31 Russett, 120 
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1.2.2 Modernization and Political Culture 
The modemization paradigm, outlined in Seymour Martin Lipset's Some Social 
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, argues that there 
exists a linear progression of causally linked phases which culminate with the attainment of 
democracy. The main stages of interrelated growth are industrialization, urbanization, education, 
communication, mobilization and political incorporation.32 The combination of economic 
security and higher education moderates the lower class, reinforces the middle class and weakens 
the power of the ruling class. The working and middle cases "gain an unprecedented capacity for 
self-organization" and as a result, society becomes less stratified.33 A common ground can then 
be achieved between classes and democracy as conflict resolution becomes institutionalized 
through intermediary state apparatuses.34 
Modemization was conceived as a general theory of democratization; however its 
applicability to the Middle East was championed by Michael Hudson. He argued that 
modemization would place considerable pressure on existing Arab authoritarian regimes to alter 
their current relationship with citizens in order to retain their legitimacy.35 To remedy this 
legitimacy deficit, Hudson affirmed that the state would need to institutionalize popular 
participation. While the social dimension of modemization should not be ignored, its 
contribution to the study of democratization lies in its emphasis on economic development as 
"the engine of social mobilization".36 According to the theory, once a society reaches a certain 
level of economic development, stable democracy is likely to emerge and consolidate. 
32 Przeworski, 89 
33 Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John D. Stephens, 'The Impact of Economic Development on 
Democracy", The Journal ofEconomic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer, 1993),74-75 
34 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Sorne Social Requisites ofDemocracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy", American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no. 1 (1959),84 
35 Michael Hudson, Arab Politics: The Searchfor Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 126 
36 Ibid., 127 and Jacek Kugler and Yi Feng, "Explaining and Modeling Democratic Transitions", The Journal of 
Conf/iet Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 2, (Apr. 1999),140 
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The economlC correlation has long been an important question for democratization 
theorists. It was thought that economic development was best achieved through "a strong 
government insulated from pressures, guided by technical rationality and capable of imposing 
order and discipline.,,37 Democracy needed to be mortgaged and it would emerge naturally when 
astate 'matured'. David Waldner points to Korea and Taiwan as model examples of the greater 
economic freedom afforded by delaying popular incorporation. While he focused more on the 
degree of elite conflict without making reference to democracy, Waldner argues that premature 
popular incorporation complicates economic development. In the case of Syria, policy choices 
were restrained by loyalties required to maintain the stability in the regime. Thus structural 
reforms needed to develop the economy could not be implemented.38 Simply put, modemization 
views authoritarian regimes as incubators of fledgling democracies. 
On the surface, the link between democracy and development is striking. The wealthiest 
states in the world are democratic. Per capita income can correctly predict 77.5% of 
democracies.39 Przeworski argues that in order for a correlation to be confirmed, there would 
need to be a development threshold at which point authoritarian regimes evolved into 
democracies. His findings, however, indicate that dictatorships survive in both po or and rich 
countries and that their collapse is unpredictable based on economic factors, an assertion shared 
by other academics.40 Sorne democratic transitions took place in countries with very low levels 
of economic development such as India, Belize and Mauritius. Conversely, countries with high 
per capita levels such as Mexico, Chile, Portugal, Iran and Iraq, remain under authoritarian 
rule. 41 Throughout history there have been many examples of modemization without 
37 Przeworski, 3 
38 David Waldner, State Building and Late Development (lthaca: Comell University Press, 1999), 37 
39 Przeworski, 79 
40 Karen L. Remmer, "Review: New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization", Comparative Polities, Vol. 28, 
No. 1 (Oct., 1995), 105 
41 Oil states such as Venezuela, Iraq and Iran are eventually exc1uded from the analysis to strengthen the findings 
since high oil revenues distort the per capita income. 
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democratization. While it is possible that economic development plays a role in transitions to 
democracy, its power as an independent explanatory variable is doubtful in light of evidence 
which suggests that "dictatorships die under aIl kinds of economic conditions.,,42 
Lipset's Social Requisites was caricatured by critics who were quick to criticize the 
assertion that economlC prosperity was III direct correlation with transition to minimal 
democracy. Firstly, Lipset's writings were aimed at explaining the chances of survival of 
minimal democracies and not predicting transitions hence his careful word choice in setting out 
social 'requisites' and not 'prerequisites'. Lipset never argued that higher per capita income 
alone automatically engendered political competition and contestation. Lipset and other 
modemization theorists such as Larry Diamond and David Plattner, argued that industrialization, 
urbanization and education are integral to altering the state's social structure.43 Industrialization 
leads to the formation of new classes and relationships. The resulting growth in employment 
opportunities encourages migration to urban centres which leads to the emergence of new 
groups, classes, collective interests and patterns of income and consumption which alter the 
societallandscape.44 
The income distribution which accompanies industrialization allows for a more equal 
income distribution which then permits a middle class to emerge. The middle class acts as a 
counterweight to the state and the impetus of change in social norms and rules towards a political 
culture of moderation.45 In his 1993 Presidential Address entitled "The Social Requisites of 
Democracy Revisited", Lipset reiterated that a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy 
42 Przeworski, Ill, Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik, Modernization, Democracy and Islam, (London: Praeger, 
2005), 13 and Larbi Sadiki, "Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization", International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Feb., 2000),86 
43 Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens, 85 
44 Mehran Karnrava, Poli tics and Society in the Developing World 2nd Edition, (London: Routledge, 2000), 100 
45 Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", Arnerican Sociological Review, Vol. 
59, No. 1 (Feb., 1994),3 and Mehran Karnrava, Democracy in the Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle East, 
(New York: Chatham House Publishers, 1998), 2 and Jose Nun, "Democracy and Modernization, Thirty Years 
Later", Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 20, No. 4, The Struggle for Popular Participation (Autumn, 1993), 10 
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was facilitated by the presence of a compatible system of tradition and beliefs. As a result, Lipset 
argues that cultural factors appear to be even more important than economic ones.46 
As a reflection of the centrality of culture in the evolutionary design of modernÏzation 
theory, a separate yet closely linked political culture paradigm emerged. Political culture has 
been defined as a "collection of the understanding, values, attitudes, and principles of a 
community or society that relate to its political organization, processes, disputes and public 
policies".47 Culture represents the link between politics and society. The process of 
modemization alters unconscious cultural beliefs and values and as a result modifies political 
behaviour, political roles and the content ofpolitical demands.48 Roy Andersen, Robert F. Seiber 
and Jon G. Wagner argue that culture has become increasingly viewed by social scientists as a 
competitive arena in which the definition of societal ideals and symbols are subjected to constant 
negotiation.49 In order for democratization to occur, the general population must be convinced to 
embrace democracy and its virtues including "the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites 
of principles underlying freedom of speech, media, assembly, religion, of the rights of opposition 
parties, of the role oflaw, of hum an rights, and the like."so 
Proponents of the cultural approach have traditionally been pessimistic about 
democratization in the Middle East. Huntington and Lipset held that democracy was doubtful as 
democratic values were incompatible and alien to Islam.sl Hisham Sharabi characterized CUITent 
Arab society as a subordinate "modemized version of the patriarchal sultanate". 52 Perhaps the 
most comprehensive analysis of Arab political culture is provided by Mehran Kamrava. 
46 Hunter and Malik, 15 
47 Rand, Dyck, ed., Studying PoUtics: An Introduction to Political Science (Scarborough: Thomas Nelson, 2002), 74 
48 Mehran Kamrava, Politics and Society in the Third World, (London: Routledge, 1993), 121, 136 
49 Roy R. Andersen, Robert F. Seibert, Jon G. Wagner, PoUtics and Change in the Middle East: Sources ofConflict 
and Accommodation, 6th Edition, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001), 151 
50 Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", 30 
51 Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", 6 and Hunter and Malik, 14 and Dale Eickelman and 
James Piscatori, MusUm PoUtics, (Princeton: University Press, 2004), 18 
52 Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988),7,31 
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Kamrava acknowledges that no common political culture exists III the Middle East, 
however he argues that it is possible to discern certain commonalities. The family is the most 
important social institution in the Middle East. In the regional context, the family extends beyond 
the nuclear to the tribal level. The tribe is a traditional feature of Middle Eastern culture which 
continues to play a significant political role in the region. Tribal members are united by a 
common geographic, linguistic and biological ancestry which makes it a "highly cohesive 
institution that remains largely impenetrable to outside influences".53 Within the tribe, the chief 
holds moral, military and political authority over its members and acts as the ultimate arbiter in 
disputes. As a result, they are both patriarchal and hierarchical and therefore authoritarian in 
nature demanding "blind obedience.,,54 Leaders of Middle Eastern states often portray 
themselves as paternal figures leading "faithful children", creating a neopatriarchal society. 55 
This is particularly true with regards the Persian Gulf states, a facet which will be explored in 
further detail in the next chapter. 
Kamrava argues that the only social institution in the Middle East which rivaIs the tribe is 
Islam. He argues that Islam provides "a comprehensive blueprint for social order. ... [which] 
ideally at least, subsumes, overwhelms and dictates aIl others".56 While most Middle Eastern 
leaders recognized this early in the 20th century and sought to ally themselves with the Islamic 
religious establishment, the practice has subsided with the exception of isolated cases such as 
Saudi Arabia. 57 Yet, as a highly organized institution with significant moral clout, Islam has 
retained its political saIience. It is remarkably pervasive in Middle Eastern society and has 
enjoyed a recent resurgence which Kamrava attribut es to the failure of secular institutions to 
S3 Ibid., 45, 49,50, 
S4 Ibid. 52, 80 
5S See James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, PoUlies in the Middle East (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 
2000) for a discussion of the patriarchal and patrimonial character of Middle Eastern regimes. 
56 Karnrava, Demoeracy in the Balance, 63 
57 Ibid., 6] 
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properly address the needs of society. It possesses more legitimacy in the eyes of the general 
population than the state. 
Karnrava aq,TUes that both tribalism and Islam constitute impediments to 
democratization. With regards to Islam, Kamrava states that it is "rigid, doctrinaire and hostile to 
any sernblance of change".58 As an example of its incompatibility with democratic values, he 
points to the status of women in the Middle East. While Karnrava do es not claim that Islam is 
misogynistic in nature, he does argue that its interpretation and irnplementation in the region has 
been repressive towards wornen. Accordingly, dernocracy is unattainable if "half the population 
is viewed as unequal in rank".59 
As a result of the infallibility of Islam and the patriarchal nature of tribalisrn, Karnrava 
argues that Arabs are culturally and psychologically subrnissive and ideally suited to hero 
worship and dernagogues.60 Discourse, bargaining and civil society are absent in Arab political 
culture as weil as any other democratic values. Therefore Karnrava reaches the same conclusion 
as Lipset, Huntington and Sharabi arguing that at this present time, the Middle East as a region 
does not possess the social or cultural prerequisites necessary for democratization.61 
While the political culture paradigm can be useful within comparative politics to make 
cross-national and infra-national comparisons, critics rightly underline that placing great 
emphasis on culture can lead to a biased view with ethnocentric undertones.62, The traditional 
political culture's methodological shortcomings are apparent within Middle East democratization 
58 Frank Tachau, "Review of Democracy in the Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle East by Mehran 
Karnrava", The Journal ofPoUties, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), 302 
59 Karnrava, Demoeracy in the Balance, 229 
60 Ibid., 223 
6 1 Karnrava does not rule out the possibility of democracy in the future as long as there is significant change and the 
pervasiveness of tribalism and Islam are curbed significantly. Karnrava, Democracy in the Balance, 34,224,225 
62 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979),3,12 and Martin, Kramer, Ivory Towers on Sand: The 
Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Po1icy, 2001), 
29 
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literature where it has often been invoked to account for the persistence of authoritarianism.63 As 
a result, the region has been stigmatized by democratic theorists to the point of alienation. 
Despite the fact that we are still within the third wave of democratization, the Middle East has 
been written off by several democratization experts cited previously such as Huntington, 
Diamond, Lipset, Sharabi and Kamrava who have dismissed their democracy prospects on the 
basis of political culture.64 
The failure of democracy to find a foothold in the region is attributed to incompatible 
cultural 'defects'. The reductionist view of an overarching Arab and Islamic culture is however 
based primarily on stereotypes and anecdotal evidence which result in "sloppy, self-indulgent or 
even damaging prescription".65 Islamic values66 are deemed irreconcilable with democratic 
princip les of pluralism, tolerance and competition. Considerable evidence however refutes the 
reductionist cultural argument. Democracies have been established in states with Muslim 
majorities such as Turkey, Indonesia and Nigeria.67 Conversely, authoritarian regimes continue 
to survive outside the Middle East. Cultural studies with methodologically sound foundations 
have also cast significant doubt on the use of Islamic or Arab values as explanatory variables for 
the persistence of authoritarianism. 
Designating Islam as an obstacle to democracy is problematic because several competing 
interpretations of Islam exist.68 Even the most radical extremists are not unanimous in their 
63 Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and David Noble, eds., Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab 
World: Theoretical Perspectives (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 77 
64 Ibid., 5 
65 Ibid., 90 
66 Brynen describes the reductionist characterization ofIslamic values as emphasizing divine rather than popular 
sovereignty, being resistant to change and lacking fundamental equality within groups su ch as women and religious 
minorities. Arab values are based on "primordialism (strong clan, tribal and sectarian loyalties) which inhibits a 
sense of common citizenship ... a lack of a tradition of liberal tolerance of pluralism and dissent, patterns of 
authoritarianism and submissiveness." Brynen, Korany and Noble, 6-7 
67 Freedom House, "New Study Details Islamic World's Democracy Deficit", Dec. 18th, 2001 
http://www.freedornhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release= 1 0 1 (Dec. 12, 2006) 
68Kramer discerns 2 different strands: Unitary (Islamic princip les are absolute and cannot be opposed and subjected 
to free debate) and Moderate (core values ofIslam cannot be debated but due to human infallibility, the 
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interpretation of the Koran, particularly in its application to policy. 69 Through different readings 
of law and morality, Islam concedes a place for openness, tolerance and innovation. In fact, 
concepts traditionally identified with democracy such as the principles of justice and 
accountability of leadership are evoked within Islam.7o Nevertheless, the role of culture in Arab 
society, whether fragmented or not, is often exaggerated. The ideological and religious 
motivations of Islamist groups are not responsible for their increased popularity within Arab 
states.71 Instead these groups are the beneficiaries of political circumstance where they represent 
the only political alternative to Arabs dissatisfied with the status quo. 
Islamists hold a virtual monopoly on any organized opposition Slllce their only real 
opponent, the political left, was forsaken following the defeat of socialist Arab govemments at 
the hands of Israel in 1967. These govemments proved ineffective in dealing with temporal 
economic, social and regional problems.72 Other secular groups in autocratic states face 
significant challenges in the absence of any civic or political rights. Conversely, the feligious 
character of Islamist groups affords them legitimacy vis-à-vis the state. The high level of 
organization of Islamist groups has enabled them to recruit adherents through mosques, 
universities and the large social networks created by the gamut of social services they offer. 
Although supporters of Islamic groups may be uncommitted to the religious ideals the groups 
espouse, the leadership clearly intends to establish govemment rule by Islamic law. This has led 
many to argue that Islamists may weIl subvert any transition to democracy.73 
Islam's violent and confrontational nature however has been overstated, a consequence of 
interpretation of the Koran can be debated). Brynen, Korany and Noble 114 and John L. Esposito and James P. 
Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam", Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No.3, (Summer, 1991),434 
69 Saad Eddin, Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups", International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 1980),432 
70 Howard Handelman and Mark Tessier eds. Democracy and /ts limits: Lessonsfrom Asia, Latin America and the 
Middle East (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 263 
71 John Entelis, ed., Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 
109 
72 Tessier cites poor performance ofleftists groups in elections in Tunisia (April 1989) and Aigeria (June, 1990). 
Handelman and Tessier, 271 
73 Ibid., 273 
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the myth that religious values espoused by Islamist groups make them prone to the use of 
violence.74 Instead it appears more likely that violent behaviour of Islamists is a response to 
repressive clampdowns on opposition by Arab autocratic regimes and the absence of any 
alternative avenues to influence public policy. Previous experiences in Jordan and Algeria seem 
to support the notion that when included in the political process, Islamists have capitalized on the 
opportunity. TessIer argues that the participation of Islamist groups in the political pro cess will 
weaken their power since they will have to share the responsibility of dealing with societal 
problems. The Islamic "solution" will necessarily be put to the practical test of political 
d· 75 expe lency. 
The political significance of Islam remains unclear. 76 The cultural approach raises more 
questions than answers and therefore constitutes a weak explanatory variable for the persistence 
of authoritarianism in the region. A solely cultural explanation cannot account for the absence of 
democratization in any region.77 That said, the cultural dimension, especially with the increased 
importance of civil society in democratization cannot be ignored. Cultural factors do play a role 
in the democratization process and they can be altered by shifting economic and political 
developments. They do not however constitute on their own sufficient impetus for 
democratization. Ironically, sorne thirty years after the birth of the modernization and political 
culture paradigms, Jose Nun points out that a number of academics presently view political 
democratization as a prerequisite to economic and social modernization.7B 
74 John Esposito, ed., Po/itica/ Jç/am: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 17 
75 Hande1man and TessIer, 284 
76 Anderson in Brynen, Korany and Noble, 87 
77 Hunter and Malik, 15 
78 Nun, 10 
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1.2.3 Transitology: Rethinking Social and Economic Factors as 
Prerequisites to Democracy 
"One road only has in the past led into democracy ... the wish to be rid oftangible evils" 
- James Bryce 
In Transitions to Democracy: Toward aDynamie Model, Dankwart A. Rustow attempts 
to detennine what conditions are necessary for democratization to occur. Rustow rules out the 
possibility that beliefs, psychological attitudes or economic and social conditions al one bring 
about democracy for several reasons. Firstly, Rustow points out that democratization is far from 
a unique process. Each successful transition to date has created its own path. This is not 
surprising since in each state democratization involves different classes, issues or methods of 
solutions.79 In addition, he argues that there exist ample examples of authoritarian states that 
score impressively on social and economic indicators. 
Instead, Rustow proposes a new model to explain democratic transitions. The only 
background condition stipulated by Rustow for a successful transition is national unit y, a sense 
ofbelonging to a singular common identity by the majority of a state's population. This identity 
can be fonned at any time as long as it occurs prior to the transition process.80 
In the event that national unit y is present, the democratization pro cess according to 
Rustow is triggered by the emergence of a political stalemate between entrenched factions. 81 
Rustow argues that the conflict of interest usually emerges between soCial classes, particularly if 
a new elite has emerged and finds itself excluded from the current power arrangement. The 
opposing camps' entrenched positions will result in political polarization. 
79 Dankwart A. RUSlOW, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward aDynamie Model", Comparative PoUties, Vol. 2, No. 
3, (Apr. 1970),345 
B() Rustow, 351 The idea of elite conflict as an integral element of democratic transitions was borrowed by Rustow 
from Barrington Moore's The Social Origins ofDietatorship and Demoeraey (1966) 
BI Rustow, 352, and John Waterbury, "Fortuitous By-Products", Comparative Polities, Vol. 29, No. 3, Transitions to 
Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow, (Apr. 1997),383 
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If national unit y is maintained, Rustow argues that certain scenarios are possible. One 
party may be able to trump the other, the reason behind the conflict may disappear or eventually 
the parties will compromise their positions and a democratic solution will be forged. Any 
compromise will be negotiated by a small number of individuals representative of the primary 
stakeholders in the conflict. The resolution will be second-best for aIl stakeholders and certain 
differences in opinion willlikely remain. However, the compromise will signal the acceptance of 
diversity and signal a willingness to play the democratic game.82 
Rustow's national unit y condition was criticized by academics such as Waterbury 
because it fails to account for the cases su ch as Ethiopia where fragile democracies have 
emerged despite the absence of a singular identity.83 It is worth noting however that Rustow's 
national unit y condition has at times been mistakenly interpreted as ethnic homogeneity. Despite 
the absence of consensus on this issue, Rustow's model does provide certain key Insights into the 
transition process. While they may be helpful, no particular political, social or economic context 
is necessary for a transition to occur. The path to transition is not predetermined and democracy 
emerges as the result of a compromise between opposing camps which resolves a political 
impasse.Circumstances may ev en "force, trick" lure, or cajole non democrats into democratic 
behaviour".84 Academics have embraced the notion that the transition process is fraught with 
uncertainty and heavily reliant on individual political decisions made by elites and their ability to 
conclude negotiated pacts. Therefore, they admit that there exists many paths to democracy. 
Today, these elements constitute the basic principles of the dominant democratization theory: 
transitology. 
82 Rustow, 355 and Waterbury, 387 
83 Waterbury, 396 
84 Rustow, 344 
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1.2.4 Refinement of Rustow's model by O'Donneli and Schmitter 
The seminal work on transitology was developed by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe 
C. Schmitter in "Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies, Defining Some Concepts". The authors offer an overview of the domestic 
conditions necessary for a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. They argue that the 
collapse of authoritarianism is a foregone conclusion in light of the success of democracies 
around the world which serve as a constant reminder of the fatal lack of legitimacy of aIl 
authoritarian regimes. A transition is therefore inevitable. The authors define a transition as the 
"interval between one political regime and another".85 Although the process is unavoidable, its 
final outcome cannot be determined a priori. The transition can lead to the re-establishment of an 
authoritarian regime, the installation of a democracyor an alternative configuration. 
With the benefit of hindsight, a transition process with a democratic outcome can be 
labeled democratization. As Przeworski succinctly states, it is the process whereby authoritarian 
regimes die and democratic ones emerge.86 Whitehead, true to form, sees democratization as "a 
process of movement towards an outcome that is neither fully stable nor entirely 
predetermined.,,87 What is important to retain is that aIl transitions are characterized by 
uncertainty. The 'rules of the game' are always initially undefined. In addition, the convergence 
of different actors attempting to protect their long-term interest in the construction of the new 
political order, often at the expense of others, renders the pro cess competitive.88 
While no specifie set of circumstances are provided, transitions require the formation of a 
schism within the ruling elite. The absence of fault lines within the ruling elite in Arab regimes 
may therefore explain the absence of democracy in sorne Arab states. Michael Herb argues that 
85 O'Donnell and Sclunitter, 6 
86 Przeworski, 88 
87 Whitehead, 32 
88 O'Donnell and Sclunitter, 6 
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the family-based state formation of dynastic monarchies is responsible for their stabiIity and 
persistence in the region.89 Leadership is restricted to candidates within the family and 
succession is decided through a deliberative process based on family consensus thus avoiding 
any potential destabilizing conflicts.90 The monopoly of dynastic ruling families over the 
military, cabinet and bureaucracy and the shared profit of oil revenues make the maintenance of 
the status quo a common goal. Unit y within the ruling elite at this level renders any involuntary 
transition unlikely and difficult, although it can never be ruled out. The persistence of military 
authoritarianism in Algeria is also often attributed to its cohesiveness among an otherwise 
divided society.91 
Where an internaI rupture of the ruling elite occurs, two factions emerge: the duros ("hard-
liners") and the blandos (soft-liners). The duros represent the conservative faction of the regime. 
They reject democratization because of the fear of the instability which in their opinion would 
inevitably accompany the transition.92 In contrast, the blandos have already accepted the 
ineluctable fate of the authoritarian regime. They favour the start of a liberalization process in 
order to solidify the regime's image in preparation for eventual elections. Soft-liners recognize 
that the longer the regime remains repressive, the less likely are its chances of playing a role in 
the future political order. Many authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have relied on 
repression to control and coerce, prompting sorne to develop sophisticated security apparatus. 
This undoubtedly has increased the number of revenge-seeking groups and the potential risks 
which authoritarian incumbents run in a democratic transition.93 
That said, the performance of an authoritarian regime do es not seem to determine when 
89 Dynastie monarchies: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
90 Conflicts may still emerge within ruling families, the assassinat ion ofSaudi King Faysal in 1975, but these tend to 
be overcome as evidenced by the sustained strength of the Saudi monarchy today. 
91 Diamond, Plattner and Brumberg, 63 
92 O'Donnell and Schmitter, 16 
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and if a transition will be initiated.94 A failed regime with little or no confidence in its ability to 
prolong its survival risks very little by attempting a transition towards democracy. In this case, 
the transition will be relatively quick since the population will be able to mobilize without the 
resistance ofthe regime. If the same regime decides to prolong its stay in power, change can only 
be achieved through armed revoIt. Thus, even seemingly "weak" states such as Syria with 
control over the military would be difficult to topple ifthey remained resolute in their survival. 
Conversely, a thriving authoritarian regime can also embark on a transition. In this case, 
blandos argue in favour of initiating a transition to capitalize on the regime's positive 
performance. The risks of the transition are low and the process will enable the regime to acquire 
popular legitimacy and improve its perception within the international community. It is equally 
possible that the regime will content itselfwith the status quo. Kuwait with its elected parliament 
would appear to be an example of the former, while Saudi Arabia, which remains totalitarian and 
has made no significant concessions, would be an example of the latter. Whatever the cause, 
O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that a transition initiated from the top will be more orderly and 
thereby more likely to be successful in attaining democracy.95 
During the initial phases of the transition, the hard-liners are the most influential faction 
in the. regime. The ongoing tension between the two camps within the ruling elite creates an 
omnipresent menace of a political coup by the duros which would nullify any progress which the 
blandos may have previously achieved. The blandos are cautious in their decision-making in 
order to avoid provoking such an outcome.96 This explains why liberalization, the first phase of 
the transition, is often implemented gradually. O'Donnell and Schmitterdefined liberalization as 
a process where certain rights and liberties are granted to individuals and groups by the 
94 O'Donneli and Schmitter, 19 
95 Ibid., 7 
96 Ibid., 22 
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government.97 These rights protect the population from the arbitrary use of force by the 
government or other groups. Habeas corpus, freedom of speech and freedom of association are 
provided as examples of rights which are commonly granted. However, no specific set of rights 
characterizes the process. 
The most important element of liberalization is the will of the authoritarian regime to 
grant additional rightS.98 These new rights help to eliminate the risks which would have 
previously discouraged free individual and collective expression. On many occasions, Middle 
Eastern authoritarian regimes have employed tactical liberalization as a safety valve in times of 
crisis. The most notable example is the Jordanian liberalization of the late 1980s amidst domestic 
unrest over the economy and thePalestinian-lsraeli conflict. Jordan unleashed a series of 
significant reforms, calling a National Assembly election, loosening constraints on rights and 
putting an end to overt state repression.99 
The liberalization pro cess however often "triggers a number of (often unintended) 
consequences which play an important role in determining the scope and extension of that 
procesS.,,100 Once new rights are extended and visibly exercised in public by members of society, 
the rest of the population will mobilize in groups to voice their demands. This phase is referred 
to as the "resurrection of civil society" .101 This is not always well-received and may lead to an 
abrupt suspension of liberalization. Returning to Jordan, King Hussein eventually determined 
that his opponents had become too outspoken. 102 The legislature was suspended and the regime 
reneged on many of its reforms. The instability created by the mobilization, whether real or 
perceived, is sometimes interpreted as a threat to the regime and a confirmation of the hard-
liners' worst fears. Therefore the stage is a defining moment of the transition because it can 
97 Ibid., 7 
98 Ibid 7 
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easily result in a retum to authoritarianism and de-liberalization. 
The failure of most transitions in the Arab world can be situated at this juncture where 
govemments, frightened by the prospect of losing power, particularly to Islamists, retum to their 
repressive ways. Brumberg underlines that many Arab regimes altemate back and forth between 
liberalization and de-liberalization. 103 The standard bearer of relapse to authoritarianism in the 
Middle East is Algeria. It embarked on an ambitious reform initiative in 1989, by calling 
elections. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) surprisingly emerged as the winner at both levels. 
The military then seized power quelling fears of a "Tehran on the Mediterranean".104 While the 
outcome of the Algerian election was unexpected, the fear of Islamists coming to power through 
democracy is widespread. The debate over whether or not Islamist groups would subvert the 
democratic system has already been discussed. While practical experience, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood's participation in the Jordanian National Assembly, seems to discredit this claim, 
Islarriist groups are still not trusted. Their performance in elections in which they have been 
allowed to participate has been impressive, fuelling fears of a "one man, one vote, one time" 
transition to theological totalitarianism. 105 
Michael Herb argues that the fear of Islamists and the absence of secular opposition 
parties prevent transition in the Arab world. The regime's fear ofIslamists is shared by liberals 
who would normally support democratization and end up tolerating existing regimes as the lesser 
of two evils. 106 Herb's findings were drawn from a case-study of Muslim countries where 
transitions to democracy were attempted. Only where secular parties were predicted to emerge 
103 Brumberg, 35 
104 Quandt, 60 
105 FIS in Algerian elections (1990), Muslim Brotherhood in lordanian election (1989) and Hamas in Palestinian 
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victorious in elections (and did) was democratization finalized. 107 
The absence of moderate opposition groups however IS largely a consequence of 
repression by authoritarian regimes and the absence of civil and political rights in Arab states. 
Therefore, while elite fears of radical elements seizing power democratically may be legitimate, 
authoritarian regimes undoubtedly exploit such fears to justify repression of Islamist groups to 
delay reforms. Elite perceptions however are as important as reality in transitology since 
developments are based on rational choices by the various actors. Therefore, as a precaution, the 
blandas usually resort to incremental liberalization. Individual rights for example are often 
granted before collective rights. 
IncrementaI reform is accepted by regime opposition groups under the threat of a retum 
to the status quo. In exchange, the opposition agrees to remain demobilized. The manoeuvre is in 
essence a bluff since the blandas have no interest in a retum to the status quo. The need for the 
opposition to moderate its demands and behaviour however is crucial to avoid antagonizing the 
duras. I08 While graduaI liberalization slows down the transition, it institutionalizes rights 
acquired during the process and makes their removal in the future much more difficult, adds 
stability to the transition and enhances its chances of succeeding. 
The reform initiatives in Bahrain, Qatar and Oman where elections have been scheduled, 
as weIl as the Kuwaiti parliamentary experience, provide sorne optimism for the merits of 
graduaI transitions in the Middle East. 109 According to Herb, these monarchies could in the long-
term negotiate a compromise reminiscent of the European model whereby power is relinquished 
to the elected assemblies. Despite the constraints which exist in these countries on political 
participation, free elections in these states offer hope that democratization is a possible outcome. 
107 Ibid., 27 
108 O'Donnell and Schmitter, 24 
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There are however many instances in which liberalization has been manipulated by Arab 
states. Liberalization is not a uniform process. It does not have to be implemented in its entirety 
and it often evolves differently in different cases. O'Donnell and Schmitter provide the example 
of liberal authoritarian regimes. Under this system, the regime grants certain rights to individuals 
which allow the government in place to gather feedback from citizens without having to hold any 
elections. Regimes however remain unaccountable to the public and liberalization can therefore 
be used as a façade which can arbitrarily be manipulated and retracted. 
The most obvious examples of liberal facades were the presidential elections held in 1999 
in Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia. In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh ran against two minor opposition 
parties; in Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ran against a candidate from within his own party 
'and in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak ran unopposed. Not surprisingly, each emerged victorious, and 
many opposition parties were noticeably prohibited from participating in the elections. 
Where actual liberalization is undertaken, demands for democratization increase. 
Democratization is defined as the process which grants the rights of citizenship upon aIl 
individuals and groups in a society. By citizenship, O'Donnell and Schmitter refer to the 
principle of individual equality and respect of collective choices. llo At the executive level, 
government becomes responsible for the rights of its citizens. Government must fuI fi Il this 
obligation within the constraints of the rule of law and always remain accountable to the 
population. This process constitutes the path to minimal democracy. According to the authors, 
becoming a more "complex" democracy requires a popular upsurge, an unexpected explosion of 
a social movement of 'the people'. III Ethnic, linguistic and class divisions disappear as the 
population is united in removing the remaining traces of authoritarianism. While there are no 
examples of democracy among Arab states, it is worth noting that civil society in the region 
110 O'Donnell and Schmitter, 8 
III Ibid., 24 
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lacks a common purpose. Arab authoritarian regimes, notably monarchies, intentionally reinforce 
local identities to create divided societies. 1 12 Nevertheless, the upsurge is not an essential 
element of the transition. As long as inter-elite and inter-c1ass conflicts are resolved, 
democratization can be considered to have been achieved. 113 
1.2.5 Elite Pacting 
The "zenith of inter-elite and inter-c1ass conflict" brought upon by liberalization is an 
integral juncture in the transition process. The competition arnong different self-interested actors 
foments instability and makes this the most susceptible occasion for a coup and a regression 
towards authoritarianism. The resolution of these conflicts can be substantially facilitated 
through the formation of 'pacts', "agreement[ s] among a select set of actors which seeks to 
define or redefine mIes goveming the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 
"vital interests" of those entering into it.,,114 Used as a tool to ensure that transition proceeds in 
an orderly fashion, pacts are temporary in nature and ease the transition. They can eventually be 
recyc1ed with their principles becoming embodied within the constitution or laws of the new 
political order. 
In order for a pact to materialize, there must be a conflict between interdependent groups. 
The emergence of new actors may require the renegotiation of pacts to better reflect the CUITent 
distribution of power if it differs from the distribution of authority. Like Dankart Rustow, the 
authors admit that pacts are compromises which do not entirely satisfy any of the parties. II 5 The 
three most common types of pacts are military, political and socioeconomic. 
112 Joseph Kostiner, ed., Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2000),56 
113 ü'Donnell and Schmitter, 34 
114 Ibid., 37 
115 Ibid., 38 
39 
The miIitary pact is significant because it can protect blandos from the prospect of a 
coup. This pact requires an alliance between blandos and at the very least a selection of 
influential miIitary officers. The object is to secure the support of the military as a whole or at 
least fragment its loyalties. As a result of the alliance, the risks which hard-liners run if they do 
mount a coup increase and therefore serve as a deterrent. 116 In exchange, the blandos must 
guarantee that the opposition will temper its demands for immediate change and renounce 
recourse to violence. 
Concluding a pact with the military can be difficult if it played a significant role in 
repression within the authoritarian regime. This appears to be an issue which Arab states will 
need to confront. As was previously noted, Arab autocracies have built sophisticated security 
apparatus to control their populations through repression. In this case, the blandos must reassure 
the army that it will not be penalized in the new political order. This creates a moral dilemma to 
which the authors offer a solution: prosecute and hold accountable the major human rights 
violators to appease the general population and pubIicize the brutality of the previous regime. 
This will serve as a reminder for future generations of the perils of authoritarianism, thus ruling 
out a relapse. 1l7 This approach also allows the military to retain its integrity. In exchange, in 
order to ensure that the situation does not repeat itself, O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that it is 
necessary to circumscribe the role of the army within the constitution and delegate nominations 
and resource allocation to civil representatives. 118 A fissure within the senior military ranks 
would seem unIikely in several Arab states in light of their close relationship with the regime, 
particularly in dynastic monarchies where major posts are monopolized by the family. 
The second type of pact is the poIitical pact. The authors characterize the poIitical pact as 
more important since it tends to be more permanent. The pact forms between the blandos and the 
116 Ibid., 25 
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main opposition parties which emerge after the onset of liberalization. The pact is ironically 
undemocratic as it aims to reduce competitiveness and conflict, limit accountability to the wider 
public and control the agenda of policy concems by removing controversial issues. 1 19 Rights are 
withheld from radical elements of society. The restriction of political parties is the second 
element of the political pact. As a result, the electoral choice is limited and ensures a certain 
continuity in authority. The final element of the pact is the agreement on the distribution of 
benefits. 
Political pacts, while not sufficient, can have a major impact on the outcome of a 
transition since they guarantee the protection of the various actors' personal interests, even after 
the conflicts which they were created to resolve no longer exist. 120 However, just like 
authoritarian regimes, limited democracies upheld by undemocratic pacts suffer from a 
legitimacy deficit. Members of the pact are eventually no longer representative of their 
constituents because of the multiplication of interests brought upon by liberalization. As a result, 
actors can no longer control the behaviour of their groups. The priority of maintaining the 
conditions of the pact explains this detachment. The inability to incorporate new actors into the 
pact ensures a popular mobilization which removes the "last restrictions on full political 
citizenship.,,121 
The absence of moderate opposition in Arab states in the Middle East constitutes a large 
obstacle to the formation of a political pact. As long as Islamists remain the sole prospective 
partner, negotiated transition to democracy is unlikely. 
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1.3 Conclusion 
While the shortcomings of the traditional modernization and political culture approaches 
have long been apparent, there remains a tendency within democratization literature to treat Arab 
states in the Middle East as different. Within the broader discipline culture, econornic 
development and international factors, while important have long been dismissed as explanatory 
variables for democratization. The emphasis placed on uncertainty and the lack of a 
predetermined outcome renders transitology globally applicable. As such, it has become the 
dominant theory of democratization. While no Arab state has completed the transition from 
authoritarian mIe to democracy, failed transitions have taken place. They have generally stalled 
due to a marked lack of desire on the part of the elites to democratize. Even in unstable regimes 
where a political alternative is desired, the absence of moderate opposition groups combined 
with the fear of radical Islamists leaves no plausible partners for a negotiated transition. 
One of the main unknowns oftransitology is the cause of the division within the regime's 
elites. Perhaps here, economic progress, economic crises, regional and international 
developments and a vibrant civil society could destabilize regimes and initiate their downfall. 
The most important point is that the outcome of the transition will be unpredictable. Uncertainty 
is not culturally or temporally dependent. Transitology's greatest asset is that it allows us to 
reintegrate the Middle East within the broader context of the study of democratization rather than 
perpetuating its exile as an anomaly. 
The situation in the Middle East is susceptible to change and sorne envI SIOn the 
possibility of long-term democratic transitions through incremental reform in Middle East 
monarchies. This regime type has in the past shown in itself to be predisposed to graduaI top-
down transitions favored by transitology. This leads us to a focused examination of the 
monarchies in the Persian Gulf. 
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Chapter 2: Explaining the 
Monarchies through Elite 
incremental top-down reform 
2.1 Introduction 
Endurance of Persian 
cohesion, bargaining 
Gulf 
and 
Regimes led by a monarchy are often dismissed as relics, having virtually disappeared in 
most regions of the world, or when in place, relegated to symbolic relevance. Highly respected 
academics such as Samuel Huntington have long foreseen the impending doom of traditional 
monarchies, arguing as early as the 1960s that their future was bleak and "the key questions 
concem simply the scope of the violence of their demise and who wields the violence.,,122 
Surprisingly, however, several monarchies continue to survive and defy their detractors. 
Nowhere are they more prevalent than in the Persian Gulf where six monarchical regimes 
continue to rule. The persistence of these regimes, despite the fal1 of monarchies elsewhere, has 
been overlooked by many scholars and merits further scrutiny, especially in light of 
democratization efforts elsewhere in the world. 123 The following chapter examines the factors 
responsible for the persistence and stability ofmonarchies in the Persian Gulf. We argue that the 
main factor which has immunized the Gulf monarchies from collapse is their strong and united 
ruling elite. Accordingly, any transition to democracy in these regimes will require a division 
within the ruling class which also happens to be the basic tenet of transitology. The study of 
monarchies as a regime type in the Gulf is of particular importance due to the extensive historical 
precedent in other regions where monarchies have democratized into constitutional 
regimes. 124We find that this historical precedent is indicative of the monarchy' s flexible nature 
which allows it to satisfy transitology's top-down democratization model of political pacts while 
122 Samuel P. Huntington, Politica! Order in Changing Societies. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 190. 
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preserving the ruling elites. 
2.2 Causes of Endurance 
The traditional explanation for the perseverance of the monarchies invokes Arab political 
culture as the determinant factor. Gregory Gause III outlines the three major arguments advanced 
by culturalists to account for the persistence of Gulf monarchies: tribalism, religion and 
traditional institutions. In this vein, Kamrava argues that Gulf monarchies are tightly controlled 
traditional regimes which stifle political and social change. They provide continuity and 
resonance and are supported by historicallegitimacy.125 
Lisa Anderson scoffs at the notion of monarchies being any more indigenous to the 
Middle East than liberal democracy pointing out that the monarchy was imposed by European 
powers as a regime type in the early 20lh century.126 While tribal support may have helped 
consolidate many of the Gulf monarchies, the states have since undergone significant 
transformation. Monarchies still promote tribal identities but tribal groups are heavily dependent 
on the monarchy and have been 'tamed', stripped of aIl political or military power in the new 
states which have emerged. 127 Others, citing Saudi Arabia as an example, argue that the Gulf 
monarchies benefit from a dual political and religious legitimacy. Gause however points out that 
the monarchies in Kuwait, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Dubai do not profess to possess any religious 
authority. Furthermore, the monarchy of Yemen collapsed in 1962 despite its politico-religious 
dichotomy.128 The third explanation offered is that Gulf monarchies embody Arab cultural values 
of patrimonialism.129 The term, first elaborated by Max Weber, is used to describe traditional 
small-scale political configurations in which a singular figure mIes over a territory and its 
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inhabitants as an extension of his personal domain, thereby blurring the div ide between public 
and private. 130 Rulers in these societies assume the role of patriarch, wielding unconstrained and 
uncontested power. The leaders' ability to provide both material benefits and guarantee the 
security of their loyal subjects, to whom they have a personal attachment, legitimizes their 
authority.131 
Institutionalists such as Herb and Anderson therefore argue that the Gulf monarchies are 
III fact neo-patrimonial regimes. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle define 
neopatrimonialism as "the incorporation of patrimonial logic into bureaucratie institutions.,,132 
Jean-François Ménard, Bratton and Van de Walle aIl describe neopatrimonialism as a hybrid 
political configuration blending tradition al customs and values on a larger sc ale with the 
institutional trappings of the modem state. Neopatrimonial states share many of the 
characteristics of their precursor. Leaders retain unbridled authority over the territory and 
population using bureaucratie posts as new bargaining chips to gamer loyalty and consolidate 
their position, staving off competing daims for leadership. Bureaucratie posts carry with them 
privileges bestowing their holders with the opportunity to amass both formaI and informaI 
personal wealth through salaries and illicit rents. 133 There is no distinction in neopatrimonial 
entities between the leader and the state. National laws and constitutions, if they exist, are 
inconsequential to the ruler who assumes the role of authoritarian despot, stripping the 
bureaucracy of any functional purpose for public policy decision-making. 
Leaders perpetuate the image of themselves as patriarch of a large family, father of the 
nation, by maximizing their public exposure, thereby creating a personality cult. This devotion is 
reinforced by the penchant of leaders to entertain personal audiences to address the concems of 
130 Jean-François Ménard, "L'État néopatrimonial en Afrique noire", in Jean-François Ménard ed. États d'Afrique 
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individuals. Retaining political power requires these leaders to perform a delicate balancing act 
in order to avoid alienating important members of the elite. While employment within the 
government constituted one form of patronage, it is usually insufficient to preserve the clientelist 
structure. Neopatrimonial political structures can be found in other parts of the world, 
particularly throughout Africa, and are not exclusive to "Arab culture". Persian Gulf monarchies 
are distinguished by their ability to build and maintain complex patronage networks without 
alienating any elites. 134 This is in large part due to their enormous oil revenues which have 
enabled them to develop sophisticated bureaucracies and infrastructure. 
Michael Herb along with Joseph Kostiner and Lisa Anderson attribute the stability of the 
Gulf monarchies to the structural flexibility of their regimes. In Ali in the Family, Michael Herb 
hypothesizes that it is the role of the family as the founding institution of dynastic monarchies 
which accounts for their resilience. In a case-study analysis of Middle Eastern monarchies in the 
post-War period (the still existing eight of Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE as weIl as the failed monarchies of Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan 
and Iran), Herb tests the validity of this variable as responsible for the stability of the monarchy, 
along with other variables including education and rentierism. 
In the case of the failed regimes, Herb finds that rulers were often isolated and had not 
shared power with their relatives so that their deaths created succession crises which plunged 
their regimes into uncertainty.135 In contrast, the family's role as the organizing principle of 
dynastic monarchies ensures the continuity of rule. Dating back to the pre-oil Middle East 
sheikdoms, political units were traditionally ruled by one family and thus the only competing 
claims for leadership came from within. Leaders were chosen intemally through family 
consensus, thus avoiding any conflicts over succession. Not surprisingly, the family played an 
134 Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa", Comparative Politics, Oct. 1987, 7 
135 Herb, Al! in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, 2 
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integral role in attempts by leaders to centralize power over the segmented society following the 
oil boom. 136 Oil revenues allowed for the creation of a modemized unmediated state with a large 
bureaucracy. Using these bureaucratic posts as bargaining chips, leaders were able to gamer the 
support of their families, thus consolidating their power. 137 As a result, the ruling family gained a 
monopoly over the state which endures today in the dynastic monarchies of the region. 
The built-in tradition of compromise engendered by the succession process ensures that 
any internaI conflict which may emerge within the family will be quickly resolved. Maintaining 
the current distribution of posts and oil revenues is in the interest of the entire family. Unlike 
states such as Iran and Libya, power consolidated within the family ensures that the regimes are 
not reliant on one person and can therefore continue to thrive for more than one generation. The 
large presence of the ruling family in both the administrative and military apparatus of the state 
renders any coup unlikely.138 In addition, family dispersion creates a network which allows the 
monarchy to collect reliable information allowing policy-makers to remain in touch with the 
societies over which they rule. Herb thus presents the Gulf monarchies as being ruled by strong 
united family-based ruling classes. This very impermeability, when viewed through the paradigm 
of transitology as argued by O'Donnell and Schmitter, reinforces their claim that the collapse in 
any regime with a unified elite is highly improbable. O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that a 
schism within the ruling elite is the genesis of the transition pro cess without which there is no 
democratization. 
Herb's analysis dismisses rival explanations for the stability of dynastic monarchies such 
as rentierism and education. The rentier state is defined by Giacomo Luciani as one "that 
economically supports society and is the main source of private revenues through government 
136 Ibid., 22 
137 Salim Mansur, "Review: Ali in the Farnily: Absolutisrn, Revolution, and Dernocracy in the Middle East 
Monarchies by Michael Herb", Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), 850 
138 Herb. Ali in the Farnily, 35 
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expenditure.,,139 The main source of the govemment's revenue, labelled rents, is derived either 
from foreign aid or a reliance on a single commodity.140 In the Middle East, rentier states profit 
from substantial oil revenue. Proponents argue that this allows the state to become detached from 
its population. Since they do not rely on their citizens' taxes, they have no obligations to fulfill 
their demands. Through oil revenues, rentier states develop sophisticated institutional apparatus' 
and welfare distribution systems. Individuals and groups become reliant on the state for 
employment and social services, which fosters a sense ofloyalty. The theory argues however that 
an economic crisis caused by a disruption in rents would cause these states to become unstable 
and perhaps even collapse as they become unable to maintain the complex patron-client 
relationships.14lRentier theory is important to any analysis of variables leading to enduring 
monarchies because it takes into account the international dimension, specifically the market, 
which other paradigms ignore. Its applicability however is somewhat limited in light of the fact 
that not all regimes in the Middle East are rentier states. In addition, while admitting that oil 
undoubtedly played a large role in the development of the dynastic monarchies, Herb points to 
Libya and Iran as examples where monarchies failed despite the presence of substantial oil 
revenues. 
The relatively high level of education within dynastic monarchies compared to the rest of 
the Arab world leads Herb to question its merit as an independent variable. While he does not 
discount it as a possible destabilizing force, Herb argues that education would have a negligible 
. . h d' h 142 Impact on a strong reglme suc as a ynastIc monarc y. 
ln Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Mo dernity the focus returns to explaining 
the persistence of monarchies in the Middle East. In his introduction, Joseph Kostiner reiterates 
139 Anoushiravan, Ehteshami, "The Democratization Process in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries", Journal of 
Social Affairs, voL 222, no. 86, pp. 55-69, Summer 2005,61 
140 Handelman and TessIer, 70 
14lKostiner, 182 
142 Ibid. 240 
48 
sorne of Herb's points, agreemg that there is a distinction between individu al absolutist 
monarchies and dynastic-hereditary monarchies based on the one hand on astate bureaucracy 
loyal to the ruler and on the other on a "social system based on kin, ethnic, religious affiliations, 
arranged in hierarchical divisions.,,143 Kostiner demonstrates the emergence of two distinct 
models of rule in pre-oil Middle East: the centralized monarchical system of the Ottoman Empire 
and the peripheral system of the chiefdoms. The Ottoman Empire used Islam to legitimize its 
rule by force, affording it the support of the ulama (religious community) and legitimacy of the 
Bay'a (people). While the source of power of the Ottoman Empire was largely derived from 
family and clan affiliations, they were able to build loyal administrative and military institutions 
through patron-client relations. 144 In contrast, the chiefdoms were far less institutionalized and 
based primarily on a series of agreements among families and tribal groups. 
While the two models appear to be complete opposites, Kostiner points out that they, in 
fact, share several characteristics which live on today in the modem monarchies of the Arab 
world: tradition of bargaining and negotiation, pragmatic agreements and social pluralism. 145 
Kostiner admits that the origins of Gulf monarchies have influenced their institutions but he 
differs from Herb in arguing that the stability of the regime is related to its performance. 
According to Kostiner, the traditional balancing of the elements listed above has become more 
difficult for present-da y regimes. The ruler is still the leader of society; however his task of 
rewarding and regulating groups within their states has been rendered more difficult due to the 
presence of competing demands. The surviving monarchies have therefore been characterized by 
the "ability of a leading family - a dynasty - to form a coalition among various social segments, 
drawing on earlier monarchical legacies, by using bargaining methods.,,146 In these cases, the 
143 Kostiner, 1 
144 Ibid., 2 
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monarchies have demonstrated an ability to build consensus through give and take and form 
political pacts, a key tenet of transitology. Regimes that failed to achieve popular legitimacy, 
such as Egypt and Iran, became detached from society and were eventually overthrown by the 
emergence of the middle class within the administration and the military which the monarchs no 
longer controlled. 
The performance of dynastic monarchies has also benefited from their relations with 
superpowers and large oil revenues. Oil revenues, especially in the Persian Gulf monarchies, 
have enabled regimes to modemize their societies while providing social welfare subsidies to 
their populations. In addition, the failures of competing left-wing nationalist govemments to 
achieve socio-economic development and their defeat at the hands of Israel have also helped 
soiidify the legitimacy of monarchies in the region. 147 
In Dynasts and Nationalists: Why Monarchies Survive, Anderson echoes Kostiner's 
argument that superior performance of monarchies relative to other regime types in the region is 
responsible for their stability. She argues that monarchism as an institution is more flexible than 
its nationalist counterpart and therefore better equipped to deal with the modem challenges 
presented by state transformation. Anderson quickly dismisses suggestions that tradition and 
culture are responsible for the resilience of Arab monarchies, pointing out that in addition to aIl 
being relatively modem states, none are endorsed by Islam. J48 She argues that the despotic power 
of the monarchies, consolidated by their monopoly on military and communication technology, 
renders them virtually indistinguishable from presidential systems. Unlike Herb and Kostiner, 
Anderson does not differentiate between absolutist and dynastic monarchies. On the contrary, 
she argues that aIl regimes in the Middle East are centralized, personalistic and potentially or 
147 Ibid. 7 
148 Ibid. 53 
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actually coercive.149 
What differentiates monarchies from republican govemments in the region, according to 
Anderson, is their ability to achieve successful state-transfonnation. As an exclusionary concept, 
nationalism places primary importance on individual ethnic groups. While members within the 
ethnic group are equal, the concept becomes problematic in complex heterogeneous societies. In 
contrast, monarchies thrive on plurality.150 They simultaneously promote the family unit while 
espousing a sweeping religious ideal. This allows them to reinforce the social hierarchy of 
family, used to legitimize succession, while rejecting the dominance of a singular ethnie, 
linguistie or cultural group.l51 While political parties and freedom of the press are restricted, the 
monarchies subsidize individual groups and allow them to gather publicly and operate without 
any constraints. 
Monarchs assume a centrality within the society by creating complex social structures, 
"acknowledg[ing], sustain[ing], [and] even encourage[ing] heterogeneity among their 
subjects.,,152 This allows them to assume the role of both patron and mediator, and the 
fragmentation of actors facilitates the task of balancing, manipulating and controlling society. 
Anderson argues that nationalism therefore finds little support, as kinship loyalties are reinforced 
by the monarchy through patron-client relations and the fostering of political alliances through 
strategie marriages. She cites the example of Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Saud and his consolidation of 
power over Saudi Arabia through marriages, a statement contested by Michael Herb's 
findings. 153 
Anderson also cites the example of the strong link between Hassan II and the Jewish 
cornmunity in Morocco to demonstrate how patron-client relationships can gamer loyalty for the 
149 Ibid. 55 
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monarchie regimes. The monarch' s ability to "assign privileges, dispense largesse and provide 
protection on the basis of personal loyalty" ensures that their overthrow would result in a 
substantial loss of privileges for many groups within the society.154 This leads Anderson to 
conclude that the strong leadership and power of monarchies, combined with their ability to 
forge and balance personal relationships with competing groups in a fragmented society, renders 
them more efficient and legitimate. It is this institutional flexibility, according to Anderson, 
which explains the persistence of monarchical regimes in the Middle East. The ability of Gulf 
monarchies to adapt and implement social and economic measures while retaining their status at 
the top of the social hierarchy bodes weIl for the prospect of an eventual transition to democracy. 
O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that democratic transitions which employ this top down approach 
are more likely to succeed because it preserves the elites and therefore reduces the perceived 
costs of liberalization. 
While the previous authors emphasized the role of endogenous factors to explain the 
stability of Middle Eastern monarchies, Gregory Gause argues that exogenous factors are 
responsible for the stability of monarchical regimes. In The Persistence of Monarchy in the 
Arabian Peninsula: a Comparative Analysis he identifies alliances with superpowers and oil 
revenues from the international market as the culprits responsible for the persistence of 
monarchies in the region. Gause agrees with Anderson in dismissing cultural and traditional 
explanations. He points out that despite attempts by these regimes to invent traditions to achieve 
greater legitimacy, dynastie monarchies in the region are modem states with large revenue and 
welfare distribution systems. 1 55 
Gause points to Yemen to support his argument that superpower alliances contribute to 
the stability of monarchie regimes. Here, the monarchy collapsed after the United States 
154 Kostiner, 63 
155 Ibid. 171 
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withdrew its support in favour of the new republican regime. Gause admits however, that such an 
alliance can be insufficient for regime stability since it can be mismanaged, as in the case of the 
Shah in Iran. 
The second argument advanced by Gause points to direct oil revenues from the 
international economy to the ruling family as a substantial factor in the stability of dynastie 
monarchies. Rentier theory explains why six of the eight monarchies in the Middle East are 
within the Arabian Peninsula. He argues that oil revenue has allowed monarchies to build 
extensive patron-client relationships without alienating powerful domestic groupS.156 He agrees 
with Herb that oil revenues alone are not sufficient and proper management by the govemment is 
essential for it to become a stabilizing force. Nonetheless, in the dynastie monarchies, Gause 
demonstrates that oil has allowed ruling families to control society by building large modem 
state institutions, subsidizing large segments of society thereby rendering them dependent upon 
the monarchy. The anticipated future curtailing of oil revenues leads Gause to predict tough 
times ahead for the monarchies of the Middle East as they become unable to continue to uphold 
their costly patron-client relationships.157 
Gause's prediction seems reasonable as diminishing oil revenues and reserves have 
coincided with the emergence of a new set of challenges confronting the Gulf Cooperation 
Council states. 158 The Gulf monarchies have experienced what Gary Sick refers to as a 
'demographic explosion'. The population in the region is expected to triple from 45 million in 
1970 to 162 million by 2010, the result of elevated population growth rates which hover between 
156 Ibid. 168 
157 Ibid. 182 and Sean McKnight, Neil Partrick and Francis Toase eds. GulfSecurity: Opportunities and Challenges 
for the New Generation, (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies and the Royal Military 
Academy Sandhurst, 2000), 109 
158 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was founded in 1981.1t is composed of six states: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Ernirates (UAE). The Council is a regional organization which seeks to 
promote economic integration and cooperation (ex. Foreign policy, security, trade) among its membership. 
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3-4% annually in the six states. 159 The increased population has put added stress upon the 
welfare state systems, with oil revenues no longer capable of covering the accompanying costs. 
As a result, many Gee countries are running budget deficits. 160 In addition, youths in the 
Gee states which account for a significant part of the population are finding it increasingly 
difficult to find employrnent. Gause states the regimes of the Gulf face difficult decisions and 
choices if they wish to avoid serious financial crises. The main dilernrna is whether to eut 
services and risk the wrath of the population which under the existing social contract has 
acquiesced to regime policies in ex change for subsidies. Or, barring any sharp increase in oil 
priees, do the regimes raise revenues through taxation even though this will likely lead to 
demands for greater political accountability and participation from the general population? 
Gause points out that several countries have already taken sorne limited measures, citing Saudi 
Arabia's cuts to funding during the 1990s and increased rates charged by the UAE in the health 
sector and for electricity.161 As oil revenues of Gulf rentier states diminish, the states become 
less autonomous from society and face increased pressure for reforrn and political accountability. 
Worsening economic conditions and their alienation of large segments of the population create 
"a volatile recipe for social unrest" and demands for regime change. 162 
The absence of any legitimate political outlets and the repression of regime opposition 
can lead to violent uprisings as seen in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain during the mid 1990s. Bratton 
and Van de Walle argue that the personal fate of neopatrimonial leaders is inextricably linked to 
the survival of the regime. The rulers are therefore faced with several options: remain defiant and 
resort to coercion, step down, or implement political reforrns in the hope that they can remain in 
power by steering the process or use these measures as façade to prolong their rule. For the most 
159Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G., Potter eds. The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, 
Security and Religion. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 19 
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161 Ibid. 69 
162Bratton and van de Walle, 82 and 83 
54 
part, dynastie monarchies have no reason to abandon absolutist rule since they face little or no 
opposition from outside of the regime. While the monarchies of the Gulf remain stable in the 
short-term, their rulers appear to have recognized "the need to make sorne gestures toward their 
populations" by renegotiating the existing social contract. 163 They have responded with various 
degrees of reform depending on the individual circumstances of each state and the level of 
opposition they have encountered. 
2.2.1 Monarchies and Political Participation 
Herb agrees with Anderson and argues that the adoption of strategie reforms by the Gulf 
States is indicative of the flexible nature of monarchies. He argues that they may evolve into 
liberal monarchies which preserve "existing authoritarian elites while at the same time expanding 
political participation", a key facilitator of democratization according to the model of 
transitology.164 In his opinion, monarchies provide a better opportunity for transition to 
democracy than any other authoritarian regime-type. Herb cites the parliamentary experience in 
Kuwait as weIl as the temporary creation of the majlis al-shura and other consultative bodies as 
safety valves to alleviate public pressure as evidence of the prospects for liberalization. While he 
acknowledges that there exists little incentive at the moment for dynastie monarchies to reform, 
Herb believes that negotiated compromise as outlined in transitology is possible in the long-term 
where the monarchy relinquishes sorne of its power. After aIl, this trail has already been blazed 
by European monarchs. 
This argument is explored in greater detail in Herb's article In Princes and Parliaments. 
Herb compares present-day Arab monarchies to other monarchies throughout the world in an 
attempt to determine the necessary prerequisites for a successful transition to democracy. In his 
opinion, this comparison is long overdue since an analysis of the unique path which monarchies 
163 Sick and Potter, 71 
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have followed to democratization in the past could provide answers to the prospects for 
democratization in the Arab world. Herb views recent reforms by Arab states and the 
experimentation with parliaments by countries such as Kuwait as encouraging signs of an 
eventual transition. This contrasts with the more pessimistic views that these experiences are 
merely "hollow facades".165 Herb agrees with Q'Donnell and Schmitter and argues that a graduaI 
transition or "democracy from above" is advantageous since it eliminates the risks which 
accompany a sudden transition to democracy. While he does not elaborate on what these risks 
may be, Q'Donnell and Schmitter contend that a rapid transition is less likely to succeed since 
the mobilization phase is likely to be chaotic and a confirmation of hard-liners' reservations. 
Herb argues that several lessons and necessary steps can be identified from the 
experience of European monarchies in their successful transition to democracies inc1uding: the 
adoption of a constitution which creates an elected house vested with ministerial responsibility 
and the ability to block legislation, the presence of political parties capable of forming a 
government, and a probationary period where monarchs manage the parliament through 
appointments. 166 Herb also finds that unsuccessful transitions were characterized by the failure of 
governments to hold free elections, leading to a loss of credibility in the democratic process. In 
addition, the interference of powerful anti-liberal groups within the administrative and military 
apparatus of the state played a role in failed transitions.167 
Applying these lessons to the three constitutional Arab monarchies of Morocco, Kuwait 
and Bahrain, Herb conc1udes that while power remains for the moment concentrated within the 
monarchy, the presence of free elections in Kuwait and Bahrain should offer hope that 
democratization in the region is possible.168 While elections of any kind are encouraging 
165 Michael Herb, "Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World", Middle East Journal 58, 3 (Summer 2004),2 
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developments, Mai Yamani points out that they have been manipulated by monarchies looking 
for "a patina of popular consent without threatening the status quO.,,169 However, elections are 
merely one aspect of the democratization process. Wolfgang Merkel requires five supplementary 
characteristics: a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, 
horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to govem lies in the hands 
of democraticaIly elected representatives. 170 He defines defective democracies as hybrid regimes 
which possess both authoritarian and democratic characteristics. Despite the progress, 
neopatrimonial traditions remain heavily entrenched in the Gulf States and the top down 
transition ofwhich Herb speaks could easily veer towards defective democracy. 
Merkel outlines four types of defective democracies: exclusive, domain, illiberal and 
delegative democracies. 17l While aIl these variations are clearly tlawed they can become 
institutionalized if their defects are accepted by the elite and the population at large. 172 Merkel 
states that this is particularly common in "societies with a low educational level or having 
clientelistic and patrimonial structures.,,173 
Although Herb acknowledges that various outcomes are possible in the Gulf, he stops 
short of making any bold predictions. Furthermore he admits that there is no set time line and 
that for the moment monarchies have little incentive to share power. Other obstacles, such as the 
lack of any viable moderate secular opposition to ease the concems of the ruling elite 
remain. 174Nevertheless, Gerd Nonneman points out that Arab parliaments are not unlike their 
European predecessors who underwent similar growing pains during the early stages of their 
169 169 Mai Yamani, "The Iimits of political refonn in Saudi Arabia" in Birgitte Rahbek ed. Democratization in the 
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172 Merkel, 49 
173 Ibid. 55 
174 Michael Herb, "Islamist Movements and the Problem of Democracy in the Arab World", 31 
57 
dernocratization processes. I75 According to Nonneman, parliaments and elections should be 
viewed as encouraging signs of a positive change in political culture. They are also evidence of 
the flexibility of monarchies as a regime type to impose and control a graduaI top-down 
transition more likely to succeed towards dernocratization as envisioned by transitology. 
2.3 Conclusion 
The arguments put forth by the studied authors provide us with a comprehensive 
understanding of the factors responsible for the persistence of the Gulf monarchies. Herb 
identifies the family-base of the dynastic monarchies and its ability to resolve succession and 
other internaI conflicts through negotiation to explain the unit y of the ruling elite. This unit y, 
combined with the family monopoly of the state, rend ers the state almost impervious to a coup. 
Kostiner also emphasizes the bargaining culture inherent within dynastie monarchies; moreover 
he views it as a crucial tool which enables the monarchies to negotiate compromises with groups 
outside ofthe ruling elite and ensure their acquiescence. This requires a delicate balancing act of 
a complex set of competing dernands which Lisa Anderson argues allows the monarchs to 
assume a flexible role in society as both the mediator and patron of the society. This societal 
control is due to the modernized state apparatus and welfare distribution system, all of which 
Gause rerninds us was made possible by seemingly limitless oil revenues. 
It has become clear however that the changing economic climate in the Gulfthreatens the 
region's monarchs' ability to maintain their sophisticated patronage networks. Their revenues 
have become overextended and force them to run large deficits to cater to their rapidly 
expanding populations. In addition, unemployment is high, particularly among the youth. Tough 
choices will have to be made to either cut back on subsidies or raise revenue through taxation. 
Either way, a renegotiation of the CUITent social contract seems inevitable and regimes will be 
175 Gerd Nonneman. "Rentiers and Autocrats, Monarchs and Democrats, State and Society: The Middle East 
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faced with demands for political accountability and participation. The Gulf States have not been 
oblivious to these developments and instead have implemented various degrees of tactical 
political reform. While Gause predicts the imminent failure of these regimes, they have defied 
sceptics before, and their persistence remains possible. However, the model of transitology 
suggests that democratization is an equally plausible scenario for monarchies given the historical 
precedent of monarchies as flexible regimes capable of undergoing graduaI liberalization and 
political reform without endangering the survival of the ruling elite. 176 The following chapter 
examines the case-study of Bahrain, a dynastie monarchy which appears to be in the midst of 
such a transition. 
176 Anderson, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East", 2 
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Chapter 3: The Case of Bahrain 
3. 1 Introduction 
In 1999, Sheikh Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifa, Emir of Bahrain since 1960, before his state 
gained official independence, passed away and was replaced on the throne by his son Hamad bin 
Isa Al Khalifa. Upon his accession, the new Emir caIled for a national reconciliation and a re-
opening of a dialogue with government opposition ending a five-year uprising which had mired 
Bahrain in a period of civil unrest. The Emir released aIl political prisoners, aIlowed exiles to 
retum, and implemented drastic reforms which granted Bahrainis unprecedented rights, placing 
the state at the front of the liberal curve in the Persian Gulf. In addition, thirty years after the 
dissolution of the elected National Assembly, a new representative body revived 
parliamentarianism in Bahrain. 
This chapter begins by retracing the rise to power of the Al Khalifa in Bahrain and the 
state's rapid modemization foIlowing the discovery of oil. This is followed by a detailed analysis 
of the reform movement in Bahrain and the government strategy in addressing these demands for 
greater political participation since 1923 to the present day. The final section assesses the recent 
political developments in Bahrain through the prism of the modemization, political culture and 
transitology paradigms. It concludes by arguing that transitology provides the best assessment 
tool of the three and allows us to conclude that there exists probable cause to believe that 
liberalization in this Gulf state will successfully culminate in democratization 
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3.2 Overview and the Early History of Bahrain 
3.2.1 Overview 
The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago consisting of thirty-six different islands in the 
Persian Gulf, three of which are heavily populated. An overwhelming majority of the population 
lives in the capital city of Manama and Bahrain's second largest city Al Muharraq.177 Bahrain's 
territory co vers 725 square kilometres and neighbours two regional superpowers, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. It is connected to the former by the King Fahd Causeway built in 1986. While Bahrain 
was the first Gulf country to discover and export oil, its oil resources are nearing depletion. It has 
attempted to take advantage of its geographical position as a regional centre to become both a 
financial hub and tourist destination. Bahrain's population of 708,573 is bolstered by an 
additional 235,108 non-nationals which are an integral part of the Bahraini labour force. 
The country is ruled by a dynastic monarchy headed by the Al Khalifa family. The Sunni 
Al Khalifa are headed by the Emir Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and rule over a population that is 
overwhelmingly Shi'a. 178 The structure of Bahraini society is built along sectarian lines with the 
Sunni community traditionally richer and stronger than their Shi'a counterparts. This has 
fostered resentment within the Shi'a community towards the govemment which has 
discriminated against them in the past. On several occasions the Shi' a have expressed their 
discontent through demonstrations. The Shi'a themselves are not homogeneous and can be 
divided into two groups: those of Indian origin, the Baharinah, who are in large part poor rural 
farmers and those of Persian origin, a minority group of traditionally rich and powerful 
merchants and professionals. The two groups are differentiated by their allegiance to different 
Shi'i martyrs, as weIl as their contrasting socio-political position within Bahraini society. 
177 89% of the population lives in these 2 major cities. Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA - The World Factbook-
Bahrain", June 21 st https://www.cia.gov/library/publiations/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html#Govt (June 21, 2007). 
For a general overview ofBahrain see Federal Research Division, Bahrain, (Kessinger Publishing, 2005) 
178 The Shi'a account for 70% ofBahrain's native population - Central Intelligence Agency 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publiations/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html#Govt 
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Despite being relatively poor within the Gulf context, Bahrain enjoys a reputation as an 
intellectual and cultural learning centre within the region. !ts adult literacy rate is 89.1 %, a by-
product of free education from primary school to university. Bahrain is home to several 
universities including the Bahrain University, the Arabian Gulf University and the College of 
Health and Science. 
Bahrain also enjoys a reputation in the region for being "free". In the Gulf context, this 
refers mainly to the availability of a1cohol. While not exactly the conventional definition of 
freedom, this factor should not be underestimated as it is both a large attraction for tourists and 
indicative of Bahrain's relatively secular society. Women for example have more rights in 
Bahrain than in most Gulf States. They work, mostly out of necessity due to the high cost of 
living, in hotels, offices, shops and banks and can venture out in public alone. 179 In addition, very 
few women in Bahrain wear veils to cover their faces and recent reforms have granted them 
suffrage. Bahrain's libertarian reputation has also been enhanced in recent years by increased 
freedom of the press and expression as part of a liberalization pro cess which will be discussed in 
more detaillater in this chapter. 
3.2.2 The Rise of the AI Khalifa 
The ruling Al Khalifa family descends from the Nejdi tribe, one of the three original 
Sunni tribes. 180 Fleeing famine in Nejd (Central Arabi a), the nomadic Al Khalifas settled in 
Kuwait with their fellow members of the Utub tribe, the Al Sabah, before relocating to Zubara in 
1766 in modem-day Qatar. 181 In Zubara, they became adept sailors and entered the pearling 
179 Graz, Liesl H., The Turbulent Gulf, (London: LB. Tauris & Co. Ltd. , 1990), 161 
180 For a thorough and detailed account of Gulf history see J.B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf & the West, (London: George 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson Limited, 1980) 
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industry where they quickly gained a monopoly.182 Bahrain at the time was ruled by Arab 
govemors loyal to Iran and this is where Iran's claim to Bahrain originates. In 1783, the Al 
Khalifa under the leadership of Ahmad ibn Muhammad Al Khalifa expelled the Persian rulers 
and conquered Bahrain. While several Sunni tribes followed the Al Khalifa and settled in 
Bahrain, the Al Khalifas ruled over a Shi'i majority. 
The previous chapter outlined Anderson and Gause' s assertion that Gulf monarchies, as 
relatively new states, have fabricated and embellished historical legacies to solidify their ruling 
credentials. The practice is common to authoritarian regimes in general. The Al Khalifa have 
also been guilty of such revisionist recounting of history, an attempt to strengthen their position 
not only to legitimize their rule but also to portray the Shi'a majority over which they rule in a 
negative light. The Al Khalifa claim that members of their Utub tribe have been in Bahrain since 
1700. Ahmad ibn Muhammad Al Khalifa, revered as a saviour of sorts, "liberated" Bahrain 
which priOf to 1783 was "full of troubles" from its Persian overlords. 183 This constituted a 
significant Arab victory in the long-standing rivalry with the Persians. To this day, the Al 
Khalifa associate the Shi'a to the Persians, an effort to continually cast doubt on their "Arab and 
Muslim credentials,,184 
The Bahraini Shi'a, not surprisingly, refute the Al Khalifa's historical account as 
fictional. They maintain that they are the native population of Bahrain and point to their local 
dialect as proof of their Arab origins. They substantiate their assertion that their presence in 
Bahrain dates back further than the Al Khalifa to the 13th and 14th century when it was a Shi'i 
religious center. The arrivaI of the Al Khalifa is characterized as a brutal invasion by foreigners 
who stripped the Bahraini Shi'a oftheir land and livelihoods and submitted them to humiliation 
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and domination, establishing a system of "political apartheid based on racial, sectarian and tribal 
discrimination." 185 
While neither account can be said to be impartial, the Shi'i version appears to be 
significantly more accurate and accounts for the socio-economic legacy of sectarian division in 
Babrain. The Al Khalifa increased the Sunni population in Babrain by extending invitations to 
tribes on the mainland. 186The Shi'a were treated unfairly and subjected to taxes from which 
Sunnis were exempt. Since the Al Khalifa conquered Babrain, they assumed private ownership 
of virtually the entire island and leased it back to Shi'i who worked the land. The feudal land 
system rendered the Shi' a dependent on the Sunnis for work and created an economic gap which 
remains today.187 The same applied to the pearling industry where the majority of boats were 
owned and captained by Sunnis while Shi'i worked as divers. The repercussions of the social and 
cultural sectarian divide reverberate to this day with Shi'a and Sunni communities still living in 
segregated areas. 188 
3.3 Bahrain under British Rule 
While the Al Khalifa ruled over Babrain, they continued to pay tributes to the regional 
power of the time during the rest of the lSth century and early 19th century. At first it was the 
Ottomans, later the Al Saud. Only when the British arrived did the Al Khalifa gain exclusive 
jurisdiction and authority over their territory as a result of signing a series of treatles during the 
late 191h century, essentially making Bahrain a protectorate of the British Empire. 189 
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The new British relationship deterred overzealous neighbours looking to move in on the 
islands. Depending on foreign states for protection and survival would become a tenet of the Al 
Khalifa's policy and crucial to their survival. This was a by product of Bahrain's small size, its 
geographic proximity to Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as its minority rule over the much larger 
Shi'i population. The British initially regarded Bahrain as an important territory because of its 
location on the shipping route to India. Later, however, it would gain strategie relevance for the 
British for its central location in the Persian Gulf, and the discovery of oil in the early 20th 
century made it a vital asset. At the beginning of the 20th century, the British appointed a 
Political Agent to the island. While the official British policy was not to interfere in domestic 
affairs of Treaty States, the British would become highly involved and play an influential role in 
Bahrain's domestic and international affairs as well as in shaping the development ofits society. 
ln the face of Iran's longstanding c1aims to Bahrain, the British were careful to maintain 
good relations with the Shi'i populations on the islands. In 1923, a minor altercation involving a 
Sunni and a Shi'i escalated into rioting. The British seized upon this opportunity to implement a 
series of refonns aimed at restoring order and redressing inequalities between the Shi'a and 
Sunnis. In a rather bold move, the British Political Resident replaced the ruling monarch, Sheikh 
Isa bin Ali, with his son Sheikh Hamad bin Isa. This was followed by a total revamping of the 
government's administrative structure. Several British citizens were appointed to important 
bureaucratie positions. The most influential appointment would prove to be that of C. Dalrymple 
Beglrave as adviser to the ruler. Sheikh Hamad delegated the day to day management of Bahraini 
affairs to Belgrave. He would retain this position for more than three decades and become the 
symbol of colonialism in Bahrain. 19o 
Not surprisingly, British meddling in Bahrain's domestic affairs fomented resentment 
among the local population in both the Sunni and Shi'a. In 1923, a group ofleading opposition 
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figures convened to fonn the Bahrain National Congress. The Congress demanded an end to 
British interference in Bahrain' s internaI affairs, the return of Sheikh Isa to the throne and the 
creation of a consultative council to assist the ruler. 191 It is worth noting that while the Congress 
was made up entirely of Sunnis, they had attempted to solicit leading Shi'i but were rebuffed by 
the latter due to their historical distrust and their preference to remain under the protection of the 
British. The movement's inability to garner widespread popular support led to its demi se. It was 
easily suppressed by the British and its leaders exiled from the country. 
At the end of the 1920s, the Bahraini pearling industry suffered a major blow as a result 
of Japan's emergence as the leading supplier of cultivated pearls. Fortunately, not long thereafter 
in 1932, Bahrain became the first Gulf state to strike oil. While in retrospect the discovery was 
miniscule in relation to subsequent discoveries in the other Gulf States, the windfall of Bahrain' s 
oil reserves enabled Belgrave to construct a modem state apparatus and fund a number of 
development projects. The booming Bahraini economy created an abundance of employment 
opportunities and as a result, many rural fanners, mostly Shi'a, relocated to urban centres, 
bringing together sectarian populations which had traditionally been geographically 
segregated. l92 In addition, a universal education system was created, a printing press installed 
and various cultural clubs developed in urban areas. 
While the windfall of oil revenues modernized Bahraini society and resulted in positive 
changes, new grievances emerged and older issues raised years before by the National Congress 
remained unaddressed. While citizens had traditionally been able to have an audience with their 
leader whenever a problem arose, the mushrooming bureaucracy rendered the leader inaccessible 
to his people and contributed to an ever growing gap between the two. 193 Bureaucratie 
inefficiency became a common theme and extended to both the judicial and education al systems. 
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Citizens lamented that Bahraini education did not provide relevant skills and training to obtain 
jobs in government and the oil industry. Instead, these jobs were being given to foreigners in an 
effort to avoid the formation of unions and political organizations and the social unrest they 
would invariably provoke. Foreign workers traditionally have been from Southeast Asia, India in 
particular, Britain and Iran. While initially foreign workers comprised only twenty percent of the 
Bahraini workforce, Nakash states that it climbed to as high as sixty-five percent in 2002. 194 This 
"invasion" has throughout Bahrain' s modem history been a main source of discontent among the 
local population. 
ln 1938, Bahraini nationals who were employed by the Bahrain Petroleum Company 
(BAPCO) complained of discriminatory employment conditions and unfair treatment in 
comparison to their foreign counterparts. Calls for reform had already been sounded in the 
neighbouring Gulf States of Kuwait and Dubai. As grievances mounted in Bahrain, opposition 
movements emerged including the Representatives of the People, the Society of Free Youth and 
the Secret Labour Union. 195 The collaboration between students and oil workers resulted in a 
stronger reform movement than the earlier BNC. Nevertheless, the Labour Union was at a 
disadvantage since its members, if discovered, were fired immediately by management. While 
the movement eventually lost momentum, it did manage to secure several minor concessions 
from the government. A national labour committee was created and a labour relations 
representative to the oil company was appointed. In addition, consultants were hired to reshape 
the educational system to satisfy the needs of the Bahraini population. 
The concessions unfortunately were superficial and did not address the movements' 
demands for major reform. Political activity during the Second World War was subdued and 
restricted to the social clubs where merchants, teachers, students and oil workers held intellectual 
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discussions. 196 In what proved to be an ironie twist, the British created the Bahrain Broadcasting 
Station in 1940 to disseminate ideas of freedom and democracy as part of its war propaganda 
machine. These ideas proved to be particularly popular among Bahraini citizens eager to apply 
the lessons at home. 
It was ultimately an entirely different set of external factors which led to the re-
emergence of a reform movement in Bahrain during the 1950s. As in Kuwait, the issue of 
Palestine resonated within the Bahraini population, with Persians, Sunnis and Shi'a aIl uniting in 
a solidarity movement. While the ruling monarch Sheikh Salman bin Hamad also sympathized 
with the Palestinians, he saw no need for Bahrain to take any action despite the peaceful 
demonstrations taking place in the streets. Perhaps more influential was the ascendance to power 
of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt to whom Bahrainis were able to listen on the radio. His 
nationalist discourse was particularly relevant as it coincided with the relocation of the British 
Political Residency from Iraq to Bahrain. While the Sheikh never wavered in his approval of 
Belgrave's conservative financial and administrative policies, the public's discontent was equally 
unrelenting. 197This led to the re-emergence of the opposition movements calling for greater 
political participation and reform. "General frustration with the existing socio-political status of 
Bahrain became fused with nationalism and anti-British sentiments which resulted in open 
defiance of the govemment.,,198 
In September of 1953, sectarian tensions flared during Ashura, a day of particular 
importance for Shi'i Muslims commemorating the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein. In the 
aftermath of these clashes, a disproportionate number of those arrested were Shi'i. In addition, 
Sunni rioters received significantly lighter sentences than Shi'i rioters. This miscarriage of 
justice further inflamed the Bahraini Shi'a and led to more protests. During a July 1953 protest, 
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police opened fire on a group of Shi'i demonstrators gathered at the prison to protest the unfair 
sentences, killing four. 199 Outraged, the Bahraini Shi'a declared a general strike. They called on 
the British to intervene on their behalf and defend them from Sunnis loyal to the monarchy who 
were intent on breaking up the strike. 
As tensions continued to escalate, four leading members from both the Sunni and Shi' a 
convened and formed the Higher Executive Committee (HEC). They caHed for an end to 
sectarian violence condemning it as unproductive and detrimental to their common desire for 
political reform. The HEC believed that the government had failed to modemize and keep pace 
with the thriving Bahraini society. They argued that the growing gap between the government 
and the population, the main source of public dissatisfaction, could only be narrowed and 
redressed through increased political participation.2oo While political participation constituted a 
significant demand, it is important to note that the authority of the monarchy itself was never 
challenged. In addition, several Bahraini institutions already incorporated forms of representative 
govemment. For example, half of an municipal councillors were elected.2ol 
As pamphlets advocating reform began to circulate in Manama and Muharraq, the HEC 
declared a general strike. Rioting broke out between opposition groups and government forces 
aided by the British. Sheikh Salman declared a state of emergency and outlawed aH political 
activity. The Sheikh believed that "aH would be well if people stuck to their own concems .. .it is 
the function for Govemment to govem, of merchants to trade, of the farmers to· farm and of the 
workers to work and .the less any of these groups interfere in the concerns of the other the 
better.,,202 
199 It should be noted that nowhere within the literature is there any allegation that the govemment ordered the police 
to tire into the crowd. 
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The British however recognized the legitimacy of the grievances voiced by the HEC. 
Careful not to publicly undermine the Sheikh, they recommended he make a series of minor 
concessions to appease the populace. A special inquiry of police behaviour during the crowd 
shooting was commissioned which resulted in damages being awarded to the victims' families. 
The govemment's actions were deemed insufficient by the HEC who were adamant that only 
political reform would stabilize domestic tensions. They petitioned the Sheikh to create a 
legislative assembly, civil and criminal codes of law, a trade union and a court of appeal. When 
the Sheikh refused to meet these demands and instead created a series of supervisory committees 
of various public sectors including health and education, the HEC declared a general strike. The 
strike succeeded in bringing life in Bahrain to a grinding hait for an entire week. The HEC and 
the government were locked in a stalemate with neither party willing to compromise. 
During this same time period the British and Nasser faced off in what would eventually 
culminate into the Suez crisis and as a result anti-British sentiment in Bahrain was high.203 In 
spite of these developments, the British were able to mediate a compromise between the 
government and the HEC while rioting continued in the streets and the general strike persisted. 
The govemment agreed to recognize the HEC under a different name, the Committee for 
National Dnity (CND) in ex change for the latter dropping their demands for a legislative 
Assembly. In addition, the Sheikh consented to dismiss Belgrave and eliminate the post of 
adviser tothe ruler. Unfortunately for the CND, the govemment claimed that its leadership was 
responsible for a series of demonstrations protesting the Suez conflict and they were promptly 
exiled. While the Higher Executive Committee failed to reach its ultimate goal of securing 
political reform, it managed to successfully alter and strengthen the Bahraini opposition 
movement by eliminating sectarian tensions by which it had previously been sidetracked. The 
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result was a unified refonn movement which to this date has not relapsed into sectarian 
infighting. 
The Bahraini government would not declare an end to the state of emergency for another 
decade. It strengthened its police force and created an intelligence agency with the help of the 
British in order to curb political unrest. Nevertheless, demonstrations and strikes continued 
during this period, usually in response to job cuts by BAPCO. Students sympathetic with their 
plight joined forces with the oil workers to fonn the National Front for Progressive Force 
(NFPF). With the help of the Bahraini security apparatus and British troops, the government was 
able to clamp down on the opposition movement and restore order. 
The Bahraini government however would not be able to rely much on the British for their 
security. In 1968, the British announced their intention to close their bases in the Gulf. Bahrain, 
along with the other Gulf States, faced an uncertain security climate. Unable to convince the 
British to rethink their decision, Abu Dhabi and Dubai banded together to fonn the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), extending invitations to the rest of the Gulf States. While the idea was initially 
intriguing for Bahrain, it soon fizzled as a result of the inability to co-exist with Qatar. Bahrain 
and Qatar had both sought a leadership position within the prospective new federation. Land 
claim disputes between the two and the fact that Bahrain still refused to acknowledge Qatar' s 
legitimacy presented major obstacles.204 Reputed as the cultural centre of the Gulf, Bahrain was 
unwilling to take a backseat to Qatar and therefore opted to remain independent. 
Before leaving for good, the British perfonned one last favour for the Bahraini monarchy. 
They organized a UN sponsored referendum in Bahrain on the question of independence or 
annexation with Iran. They convinced the Shah of Iran to agree to respect the results and when 
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Bahrainis voted overwhelmingly in favour of remaining independent, the Iranian government 
dropped its historical daim to the islands, the Shah having accepted the "will of the people".205 
3.4 ln de cisive and Wavering Political Liberalization Since 
Independence 
Following independence III 1971, Sheikh Isa bin Salman, pledged to develop "the 
necessary framework for political participation.,,206 ln June, 1972 he' created a Constitutional 
Assembly of twenty-two elected and twenty appointed members to draft and ratify a constitution. 
The constitution called for the creation of a National Assembly consisting of thirty elected 
members and fourteen appointed government ministers. Elections were held in December 1973 
with no irregularities. Although the franchise was restricted to male citizens, the voter tumout 
was impressive, as high as 90% in certain districtS.207 The two major winners of the election were 
the People's Bloc and the Religious Bloc. The People's Bloc was the reincamation of the 
Committee of National Unit y, a nationalist liberal coalition supported by both the Shi'i and Sunni 
communities while the Religious Bloc was a rural conservative Shi'i party which advocated a 
greater role for Islam within Bahraini society.208 Fourteen of the elected members and seven 
appointed ones were Shi'i. 
The Assembly however would prove to be a failed experiment. It would only convene for 
two sessions before being dissolved by Sheikh Isa in August of 1975 after it became deadlocked 
over a controversial security bill and a military agreement with the United States. The Security 
Bill drastically expanded the government's authority allowing it to arrest and imprison any 
individual suspected of a threat to national security for a period of up to three years.209 ln 
addition to disagreeing with the provisions of the bill, the opposition believed that its passage 
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into law was unconstitutional as the Sheikh had implemented it without the required approval of 
the Assembly. This complaint had previously been voiced by opposition members following the 
signature and ratification of the Jufair Agreement of 1971 without the Assembly's approval. The 
Jufair Agreement leased land to the American navy and military in exchange for $4 million per 
year. It was deemed detrimental to the national interest by the Assembly which cited continued 
American support of Israel. In addition to dissolving the Assembly, the government also imposed 
a ban on all political activity.210 
In its short existence, the Assembly had passed bills limiting the Emir's access to the 
state budget and transferring land ownership from the ruling family to the state. The 
parliamentary experience proved that Bahrainis were indeed ready and capable of working 
together having united to curb the Emir's power and check his perceived abuses of power. On 
the other hand it confirmed the fears of the ruling family's hardliners who had fromthe outset 
opposed any political reform and resulted in a deliberalization.211 Both Herb and Nakash suggest 
that pressure from the Saudi government, concemed about potential demands for reform in their 
own country as the result of a spill over effect, also factored into the decision to terminate the 
parliamentary experiment.212 While possible, the Khalifas had enough reasons of their own to 
dissolve the parliament and it is therefore questionable that the Saudi opinion played a significant 
role in their decision. 
Frightened by the spectre of reforms snowballing and becoming uncontrollable, the Al 
Khalifa reversed course. The Assembly's dissolution was possible due to two main factors: the 
Al Khalifa's strong financial position which allowed it to remain independent from its population 
and the distraction caused by significant regional developments catalyzed by the 1973 Arab-
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Israeli war.213 The Arab oil embargo resulted in a steep spike in global oil prices. Taking 
advantage of their newfound bargaining power, the Gulf States re-negotiated their agreements 
with oil companies, garnering them a greater share of the profits. The financial windfall afforded 
the Gulf States immense wealth and they began to modernize their state infrastructure through 
massive development projects. 
Unfortunately, Bahrain with its dwindling oil resources was left behind. In what 
amounted to more bad news, despite its enormous oil revenues, the Iranian monarchy collapsed 
and the Shah was deposed and replaced by a theocratic government headed by Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini. The new government renewed its claims to Bahrain and its sizeable Shi'i 
community. They encouraged the Shi'a of Bahrain on radio broadcasts to lead an insurrection 
against the Al Khalifa monarchy. In 1981, Bahraini authorities uncovered a plot to overthrow the 
governrnent sponsored by the Iranian government. The group responsible for the failed coup was 
the Islamic Front, a fundamentalist Shi'i group led by foreign clerics which sought to establish 
an Islamic Republic in Bahrain modeled after Iran. This desire held little appeal among the 
Bahraini Shi'a and only represented the will of a radical minority.214 
Nonetheless, feeling insecure and vulnerable to Iranian interference, Bahrain, as it had 
done on past occasions due to its precarious geographic position, tumed to a foreign power for 
protection. It signed a mutual security agreement with Saudi Arabia with whom they had always 
maintained a strong relationship due to their proximity and their common Shi'i populations who 
were once linked.21S The relationship dates back to the first Saudi State when the Al Khalifa paid 
tribute to the Al Saud and the latter attempted to spread Wahhabism by sending their 
missionaries. Eager to distance themselves from Iran the Al Khalifa played up their links to the 
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Saudis, tracing their relationship to the Anaza tribal confederation they both once belonged to in 
their nomadic days.216 
The rapprochement with Saudi Arabia paid significant dividends for Bahrain and they 
have since depended on them for their surviva1.217 Saudi Arabia has been more than just a 
deterrent against Iranian ambitions. As its oil resources began to dwindle, Bahrain attempted to 
diversify its economy by attracting, with the help of the Saudis, regional political and financial 
institutions. With their help they became a banking centre host to a number of regional 
institutions. Bahrain benefited from the civil war in Lebanon and by 1982 had more than 120 
bankS?lS It has more recently become an Islamic finance center, with thirty-two Islamic banks 
currently operating on its territory, the most in the Middle East.219 The Saudis also gave up their 
. share of the offshore Abu Safa oilfield to Bahrain and provide the island-state with financial aid 
which accounts for 45 per cent of Bahrain's annual budget.220 
The close relation between the Al Khalifa and Al Saud led to the construction in 1986 of 
the Saudi-financed King Fahd causeway linking Bahrain to Saudi Arabia. Bahrainis were 
initially hesitant about the construction of the causeway. They worried that it would result in a 
loss of sovereignty and distinctiveness with potential pressure from the Saudi govemment to 
adopt more conservative legislation. In addition, businesses were concerned that they would be 
undercut by an influx of cheaper Saudi imports. These fears quickly disappeared. The twenty-
four kilometre causeway played a crucial role in the development of Bahrain' s tourism industry, 
in particular its big hotels with cabarets, shows and restaurants whose primary clientele has 
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al ways been Saudi vacationers. The causeway also has an added dimension of security providing 
easier access by Saudi forces. 
The employment created by these institutions has resulted in the emergence of a 
relatively large middle c1ass, a unique feature in the Gulf.221 Composed of both blue-collar oïl 
workers and white-collar bureaucrats and businessmen, the burgeoning middle c1ass's steady 
growth was boosted by the migration of poor rural Shi' a to urban centres. Their ab il it y to secure 
better-paying jobs gained them more political influence within Bahrain.222 Saudi Arabia 
however, with its own Shi'i population has been leery of the Al Khalifas making any concessions 
to their Shi'i populations out of concern of the spill over effect. 
Unfortunately, Bahrain's economy remained largely oil-based and dwindling oil 
resources brought on a recession in the early 1990s. Government spending was curbed 
considerably and unemployment has risen substantially. Economic troubles led to the re-
emergence of demands for political reform. The govemment however "remained seemingly 
impervious to the national, regional and international reverberations of its policies."223 The 
absence of any avenue for dialogue between the government and opposition movements resulted 
in a series of increasingly violent confrontations. The govemment's response was to repress 
dissidents rather th an address their demands. 
Following the GulfWar, the dawn ofa 'new world order' prompted the Gulfmonarchies, 
inc1uding the Al Khalifa in Bahrain, to promise political reform.224 In 1991, more than fifteen 
years after its dissolution, a group of three hundred professionals unsuccessfully petitioned the 
Emir to restore the National Assembly. Instead, in December of 1992, he created an advisory 
Consultative Council comprised of 30 appointed members chaired by the Emir. As the 
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unemployment rate reached fifteen percent nationally and thirty percent in rural Shi'a areas, the 
opposition continued to gain momentum. The rural Shi'i Bahrain Freedom Movement, the 
Marxist-nationalist National Liberation Front comprised of Sunni and Shi'i and the Popular 
Front supported by Sunni and Shi'i students, workers and intellectuals united to convey to the 
Emir their discontent with the current political climate through a petition signed by over twenty 
thousand Bahraini citizens?25 
Therein, they outlined their demands for greater political participation through the 
reinstatement of the constitution, the National Assembly, the return of exiles, a reduction of the 
foreign workforce and freedom of expression.226 In addition, demands were made to abolish the 
controversial se curi t y act which essentially gave police carte blanche. In both cases, the petitions 
had been cordial and respectful of the monarchy. However, once again, the Emir ignored the 
petition and ordered the arrest of the leaders of the opposition and a crackdown on 
demonstrations which led to another round of violent confrontations and the beginning of the 
1994 uprising. Among those arrested was Shi'i c1eric Abd al-Amir al-Jarnri. A Bahraini 
"Gandhi", recognized by both sects as the voice of the opposition movement, al-Jamri advocated 
peaceful resistance and cooperation between Sunni and Shi'a who both stood to gain from 
political change?27 
During the first year of the uprising, thirty demonstrators were killed, hundreds were 
wounded and over three thousand arrested. The government purposely targeted Shi'i 
demonstrators in an attempt to split the opposition along sectarian lines. Sunnis and Shi'i who 
signed the petitions often "faced official retribution ranging from harassment and employment 
blacklisting to detention and i11 treatment.,,228 Unlike the reform movement in 1938 however, the 
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opposition was strong and united. No longer able to ignore the unrest, the government re1eased 
AI-Jarnri within four months as part of an agreement between the government and the opposition 
to open a dialogue on reform. 
The Emir attempted to quell discontent through a series of mostly cosmetic changes. In 
1995, he reshuffled his cabinet which had remained unchanged for nearly two decades and the 
following year announced the addition of ten more seats to the existing Consultative Council, 
bringing its membership to forty. The truce momentarily brought stability back to Bahrain 
however it broke down in December as the opposition becarne frustrated over the government's 
reluctance to make any significant reforms. Unfortunately for AI-Jamri, the resumption of 
hostilities led to his arrest and he was sentenced to ten years in prison for spying and conduct 
detrimental to the stability of the state. With Bahrain mired in yet another uprising, government 
repression increased. 
In June 1996, the government arrested fort y-four Bahraini Shi'i for plorting to overthrow 
the government and install an Islarnic Republic. While this attempted coup was also supposedly 
financed by Iran, unlike in 1981, there was little proof to substantiate these allegations.229 Instead 
it appears to have been yet another attempt to form a schism within the opposition movement by 
portraying the Shi' a as enemies of Bahrain in cahoots with the Iranians and the Al Khalifa as the 
"guardians of the Sunnis" and scaring off demands for reform.23o 
However, the attempt to spI inter the opposition and the exiling of Shi'i opposition leaders 
backfired. The exiles were able to mount a public relations carnpaign which won support from 
international human rights organizations, members of the United States Congress and members 
of both the European and British parliaments.231 The Bahraini government was admonished by 
several international human rights organizations for alleged human rights abuses. In a 1997 
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report, Human Rights Watch detailed "serious, extensive and recurrent hum an rights abuses in 
the form of arbitrary detention, abusive treatment of prisoners and denial of due process.,,232 
Leisl however argues that Bahrain may attract more attention from hum an rights organizations 
than any other Gulf state because its citizens enjoy a relatively high level of personal freedoms 
which makes them unafraid to speak freely about abuses.233 However, there is no denying that 
opposition leaders have been tortured during their time in prison.234 . 
Sheikh Isa's death in 1999 provided the govemment with an opportunity to re-open the 
dialogue with the opposition. The new Emir, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa made a number of 
goodwill gestures towards the opposition. Political prisoners were released, exiles allowed to 
retum and civil society was allowed to thrive as a ban on newspapers and labour unions was 
lifted. In an effort to make inroads with the Bahraini Shi'a, the Emir granted citizenship to the 
Bedouins and amended and softened the 1975 security law.235 In 1999, Bahrain adopted a 
national Charter which called for the creation of a new bicameral assembly consisting ofboth an 
elected and appointed house.236 The elected assembly, the Council of Representatives, would be 
entrusted with legislative powers while the appointed chamber, the Consultative Council, would 
serve as an advisory body. The Charter extended the franchise to aIl citizens over the age of 
twenty and made women eligible to run for office. The Charter was the subject of a national 
referendum on February 14th 2001 and it received nearly unanimous approva1.237 Shi'i tumout at 
the vote was impressive despite calls by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain to 
boycott the election, indicative of the minimal support the party enjoyed within the community. 
However, the buoyancy accompanying the adoption of the Charter quickly subsided as 
the govemment implemented an amended document which preserved the Emir's absolute power 
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. 234 Inte~ational Crisis Group, 2 
235 Nakash 70 
236 The ap~ointed chamber had one Jew, one Christian and 6 women. 
237 98.4% of the population voted in favour of adopting the Charter. Nakash, 134 
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and stripped the elected representative chamber of its ability to act independently.238 In addition, 
the Al Khalifa have diminished the voting power of the Bahraini Shi'a through rather creative 
gerrymandering making Sunni votes effectively more important.239 
This led several parties, including the major Shi'i party, al-Wifaq, to boycott the 
parliamentary elections as weIl as the institution itself. The low voter tumout accounted for the 
fact that Shi'i parties only gained seven of twenty-one seats?40 It is unclear whether or not this 
has helped the opposition's cause. On the one hand the al-Wifaq party and its allies in the 
boycott have missed out on influencing legislation within the parliament.241 Their rejection ofthe 
institution has meant that they entertain virtually no dialogue with any members of either house. 
It can be argued that the resulting divide has weakened the drive for reform242 However, it can 
also be argued that al-Wifaq party has gained from the boycott. It has gone back to its roots and 
circulated various petitions. It also organized two Lebanon-style mass demonstrations. While 
mass demonstrations are risky since they inc1ude youths who can tum violent and "raUy the 
economic elite and the Sunni parts of the Bahraini populace around the government," for the 
most part they have been peaceful. 243 On occasion however they have turned violent, mostly on 
account of the provocation of the heavy-handed tactics of the Bahraini government forces. 244 
The ability to organize mass mobilizations, along with the petitions solidified the al-Wifaq's 
credentials as a major entity representative of a large segment of the population. 
23& The amended document vested the appointed Consultative Council with equallegislative powers as the elected 
body. Approval by both houses was required for a bill be approved the appointed body held the tie-breaking vote. 
239 Katja Niethammer, "Voices in Parliament, Debates in Majalis and Banners on Streets: avenues of Political 
Participation in Bahrain", European University Institute Working Papers, (No. 27,2006),5 
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The regime appears to have reacted to the demonstrations as they have conducted behind 
the scenes negotiations with leaders of al-Wifaq to reach a compromise regarding the 
Consultative Council. They ended their boycott and ran in the November and December 2006 
parliamentary elections winning seventeen of the fort Y seats, the most by any one party. The 
election not surprisingly saw an increased voter tumout of 72%?45 The presence of al-Wifaq 
resulted in a more balanced chamber?46 It is worth noting that following the 2002 elections, a 
new party organized as a non-govemmental organization emerged, the Bahrain Centre for 
Human Rights, led by Abdulhadi al-Khanaja. A radical Shi'i opposition group, it champions a 
sectarian platform aimed at addressing the unfair treatment of the Bahraini Shi' a at the hands of 
the Al KhaIifa?47 As such it has adopted a confrontational approach which has often led to what 
Niethammer argues are sometimes intentional clashes with police while paying Iip service to the 
West as a human rights movement.248 While the party has attracted disillusioned youth, it 
remains a fringe party. However its emergence should not be ignored since it could stand to gain 
legitimacy if the reform process continues to stagnate or relapses, leaving citizens frustrated and 
disheartened. A strong radical opposition would also lend ammunition to regime hardIiners wary 
of reform.249 
This is particularly important since according to Niethammer, the ascension of Sheikh 
Hamad to the throne has created a division within the govemment between the Emir and the 
Prime Minister. Hamad' s father, Sheikh Isa had entrusted his Prime Minister Sheikh KhaIifa bin 
Salman (also Hamad's uncle) since independence with the responsibiIity of running the 
245F Gregory Gause III , "Bahrain Parliamentary Election Results: 25 November and 2 December 2006" , 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 39, 2007, 170 
246 Seats by party as ofFebruary 2007 - al Wifaq 17 (Shi'i), al Asala (Sunni Salafi) 8, al Minbar (Sunni Muslim 
Brotherhood) 7, al Mustaqbal (Moderate Sunni pro-government) 4, unassociated independents (Sunni) 3, 
independent affiliated with al Wifaq (Sunni oppositionist) 1. Central Intelligence Agency -
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/ba.html#Govt 
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govemment. Sheikh Hamad however has shown a willingness to take on a more active role than 
his father and has sought to curb the duties ofhis unc1e to the latter's dismay. Hamad has made 
changes to the cabinet, appointing a second woman and a Persian Shi'i as ministers of minor 
portfolios. Sheikh Hamad also made headlines when in an unprecedented move he dismissed the 
Minister of the Interior, a member of the ruling family. Niethammer argues that the Emir has 
been trying to replace the 'old guard' which inc1udes the Prime Minister, as it opposes any 
reform?50 Complicating matters is the fact that both maintain an entourage of advisors and 
consultants. While at times it is unc1ear who is making which decisions, both the Emir and the 
Prime Minister have an interest in maintaining the power of the Al Khalifa.25 1 
One element on which the Emir has long been able to rely is his strong relationship with 
the United States?52 The Americans, as early as 1949, have.used Bahrain as a military operations 
base. While the Jufair agreement represents the pillar of this relationship, Bahrain only truly 
became a vital asset for the United States after the first Gulf War. The United States designated 
Bahrain as a major non-NATO ally and signed a bilateral free trade agreement and security 
agreement in September 2004?53 Bahrain currently hosts the Fifth Fleet of the US navy and over 
1,500 personne1.254 While c10ser ties with the United States and their continued military presence 
have engendered local resentment, it has reduced the Al Khalifa's reliance on Saudi Arabia?55 
Bahrain has traditionally been able to count on US support of the regime and its "efforts to 
ensure its stability" due to American fears that political reform would lead to the emergence of a 
250 Niethammer, 9 
251 Ibid. 10 
252 Bahrain has contributed troops to assist the Americans in Iraq. It has also been helpful in curtailing terrorist-
related banking activity as part of the War on Terror. United States Department of State -
thttp://www.state.govlr/pa/eilbgn/26414.htm 
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Shi'i regime syrnpathetic to Iran and opposed to the presence of the US military. Thus they have 
yet to apply any significant pressure on the Al Khalifa to enact political reforms?56 
3.5 Assessing Bahrain through the paradigms of Modernization, 
Political Culture and Transitology 
3.5.1 Modernization and Political Culture in the 8ahraini Context 
Following the discovery of oil, Bahrain rapidly industrialized and the industrial sector 
continues to account for a significant portion of the country's annual Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). In 2003, industry represented 41.8% of Bahrain's annual GDP.257 The figure actually 
indicates a dec1ine as demonstrated by the 51 % share of the GDP it occupied in 1984?58 
Urbanization in Bahrain is also very elevated with 90% of the population living in urban 
centres?59The 85% urbanization rate in Bahrain in 1975 proves that this is hardly a recent 
development.260 The 2004 per capita income in Bahrain was measured at $20,758. Per capita 
income in Bahrain has since the oil boom remained relatively elevated and it shares the 
distinction of being c1assified as a "high income state" along with its fellow Gulf neighbours?61 
As a result Bahrain also boasts a strong middle cIass. 
Bahrain's education rates are also notable. The Bahraini state placed particular emphasis 
on creating a solid scholastic system and as was mentioned earlier takes pride in its reputation as 
an educated society. This is reflected by its high literacy rate of 86.5%?62 The literacy rate 
among Bahraini youths is even higher at 97.1 %, an identical figure to its school enrolment rate 
256 Ibid. 68 
257 The Service seetor aeeounted for 59.9% of the GDP - World Bank, "Bahrain At a Glanee", September 19th 2005, 
http://devdata.worldbank.orglAAGlbhr aag.pdf, July 27 2007 
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which extends to secondary school education.263Education is also equally accessible to women 
and men scoring a 1 on the Gender Parity Index.264 
Although we cannot quantify Bahrain's political culture, the behaviour and demands of 
opposition groups as weIl as the CUITent rights and freedoms granted to its citizens reveal that 
society is also predisposed to democracy. While the extensive set of rights and freedoms 
accorded by the Bahraini govemment are relatively recent, a civic culture can be found in 
Bahraini society even prior to the county's official independence in 1971. As we have detailed 
earlier, the Bahraini opposition movement dates back to the late 1930' s, re-emerging at various 
intervals in the 1950's, 1970's and more recently in 1999 in the form of large mass movements. 
While the power and influence of these mass movements increased over time due to better 
organization and lessons leamed from previous experiences, the demands have al ways centred 
around increasing political participation through contested elections. In its relatively short 
parliamentary experience in both the 1970s and today, elected officiaIs have demonstrated both a 
willingness and ability to play the democratic game. 
Viewed through the prism of the modemization and political culture paradigms, Bahrain 
appears to represent a fertile ground for democracy. This assessment is based on a series of 
favourable economic and social indicators. Elevated levels of industrialization, urbanization, 
education, per capita income suggest an economically "modem" society. A traditionally pro-
democratic opposition movement and the recent drastic liberalization of Bahraini society are 
indicative of its progressive political culture. While the presence of positive social and economic 
263 Figure is from 2005 statistics. United Nations Development Programme 
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/datasheets/cty ds B H R. htm 1 
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conditions in Bahrain are encouragmg, as we have shown, for the most part these do not 
represent recent developments. Thus while modemization has occurred in Bahrain and it 
arguably led to cultural change, if these were the only prerequisites to democracy, Bahrain 
would likely already be democratic. Instead the reason for renewed optimism regarding 
Bahrain's prospects for democratization revolves around the emergence of a schism in the ruling 
elite and the presence of a moderate opposition which have increased the likelihood of an 
eventual democratic pact. These are the factors which according to the paradigm of transitology 
explain and contextualize recent political developments in Bahrain. 
3.5.2 Transitology applied to Bahrain 
As was discussed in the initial chapter, the presence of moderate opposition groups 
capable of fonning a pact with soft-liners within the ruling elite advocated by Q'DonneIl and 
Schmitter have largely been absent in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East in general. This 
element of transitology partly explains why democratization appears to have failed to 
materialize in Arab states to date. While we can speculate as to what impact the British presence 
had on the dissemination of democratic ideas, it is clear that Bahrain's indigenous proletariat 
holds the most experience in political action within the Gulf.265 It is also one of the oldest reform 
movements in the region. The highly visible presence of a moderate pro-democracy opposition 
augurs weIl in an assessment for the prospect of democratization in Bahrain. 
Bahrain's labour movement dates back to the pearling industry. As we have noted, the 
labour movement has obtained concessions on numerous occasions from both industry and 
govemment, thereby creating avenues through which grievances can be expressed. Bahrain also 
holds the distinction of being the most educated Gulf State with a literacy rate over 90%. While 
higher education is not a requisite of democratization, it is helpful to the process in that it 
265 Graz, 138 
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moderates the opposition.266 The other factor which distinguishes Bahrain from its regional 
counterparts and facilitates the formation of political pacts in transitology is its established 
middle class, which often plays a key role in creating a middle ground during transitions. Its 
emergence also allowed sorne poor rural Shi'i to move up within Bahrain's social hi erarchy , 
gamering more clout within society. 
The moderate behaviour of the Shi'a III the Bahraini reform movement is especially 
significant considering the systematic discrimination they have endured under the Al Khalifa. 
Nakash argues that Shi'ism is somehow more predisposed to democracy than its Sunni 
counterpart.267 He bases this argument on the special relationship between Shi'i followers and 
clerics. While the preservation of the Islamic community' s unit y is sacred for Sunnis to the point 
that they will tolerate a despot, Shi'a recognize no authority on earth?68 While they follow the 
leadership of mujtahids, doctors of Islamic law, they choose which one to follow based on their 
own preference. It is rare that mujtahids attract large followings, however if they manage to do 
so they acquire both financial and political clout which allows them to remain independent from 
the state. They are, however, at aIl times accountable to their followers who form their power 
base. Nakash therefore argues Shi'i ability to choose mujtahids and check their power are values 
consistent with democracy.269 
Although Nakash's argument is novel, it falls into a culturalist pi tfall , implying that 
Sunnis are less predisposed to democracy. The example of Iran drives home the point that 
religious values can be manipulated to justify a non-democratic order while a democratic 
266 Lipset, 84 
267 Shi'ism emerged as a separate Islamic sect as a result of the controversial succession following the Prophet 
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Indonesia could be cited as an example of Sunni compatibility. Nakash underlines the openness 
to democracy exhibited recently by the Shi'i populations of Babrain, Saudi Arabia and Iraq 
among others. However, their receptiveness is more likely explained by Nakash's other 
argument, that it stems from a desire to redress the power balance in their favour and more 
accurately reflect their demographic status within these states. In Babrain and Iraq, in particular, 
where the Shi'i population vastly outnumbers their Sunni counterparts, democracy represents an 
enticing alternative to the current power arrangement. The opposition movement in Babrain, 
however, has been unique in its non-sectarian emphasis. While political societies within Babrain 
are often affiliated to certain sects, the pro-democratic activism is prevalent among both Shi' a 
and Sunnis. The support for the democratic movement itself is astonishing within the larger 
context of the region. 
Barry Rubin in his book, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab struggle for Democracy 
in the Middle East, examines the state of liberalism in the Arab world. Through interviews with 
prominent Arab reformers he paints a bleak picture.270 The position of Arab regimes on issues 
within Arab society including human rights, poverty, and the rights of women is to either deny 
their existence or fault the West and Israel. Similarly, Islamists blame foreign intervention and an 
insufficient commitment to Islam within society. Since the failure of Arab nationalism, most 
Arab states in the region have been less receptive to foreign ideas and concepts. 
Islamists, who are able to thrive since religion is often the "only uncensored public 
expression in most Arab countries", have become the only alternative to the govemment in many 
Arab states and thus the status quo has been perceived as the lesser oftwo evils.271 LiberaIs who 
have attempted to make their mark have been branded as un-Islamic imperialist traitors. They 
270 Rubin de fines refonners as "people who support one or more ofthe following concepts: multiparty parliamentary 
democracy, human rights, a more toleranl interprelation ofIslam, rapprochement with the West and peace with 
Israel". Barry Rubin, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Strugglefor Democracy in the Middle East, (New 
Jersey: John WiJey & Sons Ine., 2006), 3 
271 Ibid. 32 and 34 
87 
have become social outcasts. In fact, governments often crackdown on reformers to curry favour 
with Islarnists. 
This dynamic is notably absent in Bahrain. Despite the fact that Bahrainis accord 
importance to religion, they live in a relatively secular society. Accordingly, radical Islamist 
organizations such as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain have found it very difficult 
to gain public support even at the height of public discontent. The monarchy itself, although 
Sunni, does not claim to possess any religious affiliation or legitimacy, unlike its Saudi 
neighbours with Wahhabism. The availability of alcohol and the landmark rights accorded to 
women are the most obvious indication of the Al Khalifa's moderate religious stance. The muted 
sectarianism has removed an otherwise destructive obstacle in unifying the opposition 
movement, facilitating the creation of a political pact between Sunni and Shi'i opposition elites 
as envisioned by O'DonneIl and Schmitter's theory. This has been a feature of the opposition 
movement ever since the late 1930s when sectarian infighting derailed the reform movement. 
Since that time, Bahraini opposition elites have proved to be capable of keeping their supporters 
among the general population under control and the movement has not outwardly provoked any 
violence, When clashes have occurred, they have resulted from the reaction to heavy handed 
police tactics. 
A final feature of the opposition which bodes weIl for an eventual transition to 
democracy is the wiIlingness of the opposition to work for reform within the existing political 
structure. At no point during the long history of the Bahraini opposition movement has any 
significant actor caIled for the removal of the Al Khalifa. Despite having been subjected to 
human rights abuses at the hands of the Al Khalifa throughout their history, the Shi'a do not 
appear to be vindictive. Instead, like aIl reform movements, Shi'i and Sunni opposition leaders 
seek to check the power of the executive without a purge of the regime' s ruling elite. 
88 
There have been other encouragmg developments along the parameters of the 
transitology paradigm which constitute progress in Bahrain. While elected institutions have been 
labelled as unsatisfactory by the opposition, the electoral process itself has been free of any 
irregularities. Freedom of expression and press are in large part respected. This tolerance has also 
extended to the internet which has played a large role in the opposition movement, acting both as 
a forum for discussion and a medium to disseminate infonnation about upcoming events. Most 
Shi'i villages run their own websites and keynote opposition speeches are streamed live.272 
Peaceful demonstrations are for the most part tolerated and Bahrain's society "off ers a complex 
matrix of interlinking social institutions,,??3 This acceptance of public dialogue has resulted in a 
change in attitude from the govemment which has become more willing to negotiate with the 
opposition. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Despite the graduaI top-down refonns implemented by the Al Khalifa, the monarchy has 
yet to relinquish its hold on executive power and Bahrain remains a liberal authoritarian regime. 
Due to the advanced state of the liberalization process, whether or not the new Emir' s actions are 
aimed at eventual democratization may be less critical. As O'Donnell and Schmitter argued, 
once liberalization has reached an advanced stage it can take on a life of its own and spin out of 
the ruling regime's control. In addition, the Al Khalifa's diminished power makes it unlikely 
they could survive the backlash which would accompany the removal or curtailing of rights and 
refonns. Even if Saudi and American support remains steadfast, the example of Iran, once an 
272 Niethammer, 6 
273 Ibid., 7 
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American-backed oil rich monarchy, and its collapse provides a cautionary reminder that such 
1 d . 1 274 support a one oes not guarantee survlva . 
The Al Khalifa will soon reach a crucial crossroad. Due to the flexibility of monarchies 
as a regime type, political reform does not mean the disappearance of the ruling family. They can 
remain in power while slowly devolving power to eventually become a constitutional monarchy. 
If the population becomes increasingly annoyed by a lack of progress it is possible that more 
radical elements such as the Bahrain Centre for Ruman Rights could gain popularity. Moderate 
opposition leaders risk losing control of their followers. No longer backed up by British forces or 
by tremendous oil wealth, the regime cannot afford to backtrack on its liberalization initiatives as 
it did in 1975 wh en it dissolved the National Assembly. The moderate opposition movement 
represents a window of opportunity for the Al Khalifa which would allow them to preserve their 
influence on Bahrain for many years to come within the cadre of a constitutional monarchy. 
O'Donnell and Schmitter stress that the transition period is fraught with uncertainty and there is 
no fixed outcome. Thus while the stars seem to be aligning in Bahrain with a potent mix of 
advanced liberalization, a strong moderate opposition and a weak and divided ruling elite, 
democratization is not guaranteed. It does, however, allow us to be optimistic that the 
liberalization process in Bahrain will succeed and lead to democratization. 
Bahrain is not the only Gulf country where demands for greater political participation 
have surfaced. The demands for reform and the govemment responses to them are the subject of 
the next chapter as we compare and contrast Bahrain with two Gulf States which have employed 
altemate strategies in responding to these challenges. 
274 The Iranian revolution installed a theocracy which is not considered democratic. The reference made here is to 
the Shah's faB, which proved that foreign support alone is not sufficient for a regime to survive, and not to the 
events that foBowed. 
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Chapter 4: A Comparative Analysis of Liberalization in the 
Persian Gulf: The Cases of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
4.1 Introduction 
While Bahrain has made great strides with reforms enacted in recent years, the rest of the 
Gulf States have provided their own idiosyncratic response to demands for greater political 
participation. A homogeneous lot, the many similarities facilitate comparison among these states. 
Ruled by dynastie monarchies, their oil-based economies have generated wealthy welfare states 
geared towards relatively small populations, complimented by a large contingent of foreign 
nationals who represent a significant part of their labour force. 
The following chapter examines two countries, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which have 
adopted polar opposite regime strategies in dealing with political opposition. Kuwait's 
liberalization process is the most comparable, in terms of significant progress, to that ofBahrain. 
The opposition in Kuwait has been moderate and, like Bahrain, has sought to reform the political 
system without overhauling the monarchy. The Kuwaiti regime has been able to accommodate 
opposition demands for political reform without sharing any executive power, which has a1lowed 
them to consolidate an already strong govemment. The case of Saudi Arabia however, serves as 
an example of a regime where the ruling family has remained virtually impervious to demands 
for greater political participation and freedoms with only minor, mostly cosmetic liberalization. 
Their closed society has fostered radical opposition groups. The Saudi example provides a useful 
contrast to the developments in Bahrain and those in Kuwait which we believe are meritorious 
and worthy of optimism for eventual transition to democracy. While Kuwait is at an advanced 
stage of liberalization, transition is more likely to occur first in Bahrain because of the present-
day economic and social pressures which face its regime and the fissure within its ruling elite, 
which the Al Sabah of Kuwait have yet to encounter. 
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4.2 Kuwait 
4.2.1 Overview, History and Past Liberalization 
The Persian Gulf State of Kuwait covers 17, 820 square kilometres and shares borders 
with neighbours Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The state is ruled by the dynastic Al Sabah monarchy, 
currently led by the Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah. The AI Sabah are descendents of 
the Sunni Utub tribe. They rule over a population of 2.5 million, including an additional 1.29 
million non-nationals?75 Its population is 60% SunnÎ and also includes a sizeable 25% Shi'i 
minority?76 Kuwait possesses 10% of the world's known oil supply, the driving force behind its 
economy. The unemployment rate in Kuwait is a marginal 2.2% and its population is highly 
educated with a literacy rate of93.3%?77 
Kuwait is the Gulf state with the longest tradition of parliamentarianism. Prior to the 
discovery of oil, its merchant class, through consultative councils (majlis), held the ruling Al 
Sabah monarchy in check. The Al Sabah provided the merchants with protection in exchange for 
recognition of the monarchy's authority and a share of their profits. The Al Sabah were 
financially dependent on the comparatively wealthy merchants. 
Faced with the rise of Saudi Arabia as a regional power, the Al Sabah formed a 
partnership with the British in 1899. This relationship allowed the Al Sabah to consolidate is 
power like the AI Khalifa of Bahrain. The increased power under Sheikh Mubarak the Great 
strained relations between the monarchy and the merchant notables. The introduction of taxes 
was not weil received and triggered demands for political participation?78 Following the death of 
Mubarak, the merchants insisted on the creation of an elected legisiative counciL A council of 
275 Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA The World Factbook - Kuwait", June 12111 2007, 
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fourteen elected members chaired by the new Sheikh Ahmad AI-Jabir's cousin was reluctantly 
created in 1938.279 While it only operated for six months prior to its dissolution by the King, the 
majlis was active during this period pushing through economic and social reforms. This 
constituted the first instance of political reform in the Gulf and 1938 is still referred to in Kuwait 
as the "Year of the majlis".280 
The discovery of oil in Kuwait dramatically altered the political landscape and spurred 
substantial development of state infrastructure as had been the case in Bahrain. The massive 
windfall of oil revenues which had ballooned to $169 million by 1953 allowed the Al Sabah to 
become financially independent. Taxes were eliminated and univers al education, health care, and 
subsidized housing were provided by the state. The creation of a sophisticated state apparatus 
and the large number of development projects led to the arrivaI of a large foreign worker 
population. These developments had a profound impact on the composition of the Kuwaiti 
reform movement which was no longer restricted to the members of the merchant class. It 
expanded to include two new groups: the intelligentsia composed of young educated, sometimes 
abroad, Kuwaitis and Arab nationalists, and the oil workers who formed the backbone of the 
country's labour force?81 
In 1962, one year after gaining its independence, Kuwait adopted a constitution which 
created a uni cameraI National Assembly comprised of fi ft y elected members. Kuwaiti cabinet 
ministers, traditionally members of the ruling family, were also accorded votes in the legislature. 
The elections were fair and for the first time Shi'i and Bedouins candidates managed to get 
elected. The Assembly would not be dissolved for almost fifteen years despite the occasional 
clash with the government, usually over cabinet appointment and accusations of election rigging. 
In 1976, the Emir, fearful of civil strife in Lebanon spilling over into Kuwait, dissolved the 
279 Voting and candidacy were restricted to male members of the merchant class. 
280 Zahlan 38 
281 Ibid. 4 i 
93 
Assembly.282 By 1981, it was reinstated by the Emir, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad, after repeated 
requests from the opposition. 
Once again the Assembly was not intimidated by the government and sought to fuI fi Il its 
responsibility as a check on its power. In 1985, it forced the resignation of Sheikh Salman al-
Duaij Al Sabah, the Minister of Justice after it was discovered that he had stolen $7 million from 
a fund set up to compensate small investors in the aftermath of the crash of the Kuwaiti stock 
exchange.283 A year later, in the wake of a campaign by saboteurs to target the Kuwaiti oil 
infrastructure, the Assembly called the Cabinet to appear before it. The Assembly was 
dissatisfied with the govemment's failure to adequately protect the country's oil infrastructure 
and demanded that the Cabinet take responsibility. As a result, the Cabinet resigned on July 1 st 
1986. The Emir was displeased by this development and, eager to reaffirm his authority, he 
dissolved the Assembly yet again.284 
The Assembly remained suspended when Kuwait was invaded by Iraq in 1991. Saddam 
Hussein had miscalculated the reaction of the locals who remained staunchly loyal to the Al 
Sabah, in particular Kuwaiti Shi'a who formed the backbone of the Kuwaiti resistance. This was 
a reflection of the sharp contrast between the Al Sabah's relationship with the Shi'i community 
and those of the Al Khalifa and the Al Saud regimes. While Kuwaiti Shi' a have on occasion 
suffered occasional discrimination, the Al Sabah have had a very tolerant policy towards them 
and they play an important role in Kuwaiti society, occupying positions in parliament, the army 
and the police.285 They therefore take pride in their Kuwaiti identity and view the Al Sabah as a 
unifying national symbol. 286 
282 Ibid., 51 Although they are not geographical neighbours, the potential of a spill-over effect from the turmoil in 
Lebanon undoubtedly fueIJed fear on the part of the Kuwaiti regime that its own political situation could deteriorate 
into similar umest. 
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In the aftennath of Desert Stonn in 1991, the opposition demanded that the Assembly be 
reopened. The demand was reinforced by pressure from the United States as the American public 
struggled with the notion of having come to the aid of an authoritarian regime.287 The Emir 
Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad AI-Jaber Al-Sabah agreed and elections were held in October of 1992. 
The Assembly has remained in session since that time, with regular elections. Notable refonns 
have included the extension of the right to vote and run for parliament to women in 2005, the 
right to public assembly and more expansive freedom of the press. 
4.2.2 Assessing Kuwaiti Prospects for Democratization through the 
paradigms of Modernization, Political Culture and Transitology 
There exist many parallels between Kuwait and Bahrain. Both the Al Sabah and the Al 
Khalifa benefited from striking a close relationship with the British at the tum of the 20th century 
to consolidate their power over their respective territory. The discovery of oil allowed both states 
to develop modem sophisticated infrastructures and build welfare states offering impressive 
social services without taxing their population. While wealth remains concentrated in the ruling 
family, Kuwait's per capita income is high like its Bahraini counterpart at $19,384.288 As early 
as 1984, the industrial sector of the Kuwaiti economy accounted for 59.1% of the GDP?89 
As it did in Bahrain, industrialization was also followed closely by rapid urbanization. By 
1975, 89.4% of the Kuwaiti population was situated in urban centres. Today, urbanization has 
reached a remarkable 96%.290 Kuwait's population is also highly educated as indicated by its 
93.3% literacy rate which exceeds even Bahrain's already impressive score.291 In addition, its 
287 Ibid. 56 
288 Figures in US Dollars. United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 2006 - Beyond 
Seareity: Power, Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis - Kuwait", August 1 2007, 
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statisties/eountries/data sheets/ety ds KWT.html, August 1 2007 
289 World Bank, "Kuwait At a Glanee", September 192005, http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/kwt aag.pdf, July 
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291 Statistie is taken [rom 2006. World Bank, "Kuwait Data Profile", July 31 2007, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=KWT, July 312007, Kuwait's youth 
95 
GPI of 1 is indicative of the equal access to education enjoyed by Kuwaitis regardless of 
gender?92 
Kuwait's refonn movement, like Bahrain's dates back to the beginning of the 20th 
century and throughout its existence has managed to secure concessions regarding freedoms and 
rights from the Al Sabah. Kuwait's opposition movement also shares with its Bahraini 
counterparts a willingness to refonn the existing political system without purging the ruling 
family. The opposition has also shown on several occasions the ability to unite against the 
government, particularly with regards to the make-up of the cabinet. In both cases, the 
governments at times felt threatened and deliberalized: the Khalifa in 1975 when they c10sed the 
National Assembly and Al Sabah on several occasions when they dissolved the parliament. 
Undeterred, both the Kuwaiti and Bahraini opposition movements continued in their quest for 
refonn which in retrospect appear to have paid off. 
The social, economic and cultural prerequisites stipulated by the modemization and 
political culture paradigms have been satisfied for a number of years in Kuwait as they have in 
the case of Bahrain. Industrialization, urbanization, education and per capita income are aIl 
elevated. A developed civic culture is also present. These factors alone, however, have proved 
incapable ofproducing a transition to democracy. As in the case of Bahrain, the Kuwaiti political 
context and the persistence of authoritarianism is best explained though the prism oftransitology. 
While Kuwait and Bahrain share favourable economic indicators, geological 
circumstances differentiate the two states and their democratic outlooks. Kuwait's oil reserves 
are far from depleted. Combined with the recent surge in oil prices, the Al Sabah remain strong, 
united and awash with money. As such, transitology tells us that democratization under this 
literacy rate is 99.7% . United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 2006 - Beyond 
Scarcity: Power, Poverty, and the Global Water Cri sis - Kuwait" 
http://hdr.undp.orglhdr2006/statistics/countries/data sheets/cty ds KWT.html 
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scenario is highly unlikely. Their limitless finances have allowed them to maintain their costly 
patronage networks and good relations with minority segments of their population, particularly 
the Shi' a. Despite the fact that foreign workers account for 80% of the Kuwaiti labour force, the 
country enjoys strong economic conditions and virtually non-existent unemployment. This is in 
sharp contrast to the worsening economic conditions in Bahrain. Popular grievances in Kuwait 
are therefore more muted as is dissatisfaction with the status quo. Government repression is rare. 
In addition, like Bahrain, Kuwait is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and 
benefits from a strong bilateral relationship. There is therefore little American pressure for 
greater political reform. Reforms which have been accorded have been voluntary concessions by 
the Al Sabah which further enhance their legitimacy. The Assembly itself is said to be used as a 
tool to monitor and manage opposition by preventing the emergence of radical groups into the 
mainstream.293 Nevertheless, the elections are held regularly and the Assembly has over time 
accrued more substantive legislative powers which allow it to influence the setting of a public 
agenda and even wield limited control over the cabinet.294 
Since the Al Sabah regime is so secure, it is presently not confronted with any tough 
political policy choices. The lack of urgency makes it therefore unlikely that Kuwait will 
democratize any time soon. However, Kuwait's parliamentary tradition has become 
institutionalized within its society and it is therefore understandable why sorne experts remain 
optimistic that democratization through top-down reform and increased power-sharing 
arrangements could occur, albeit, at a very graduaI and controlled rate. Herb cites the Kuwaiti 
example to support his argument that dynastic monarchies can be compatible with liberalization 
and parliamentarism. While it is certainly not a democracy and the franchise remains limited to 
the small percentage of individuals who possess Kuwaiti citizenship, the Kuwaiti regime 
293 Nakash 45 
294Diamond, Plattner and Brumberg, 84 
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constitutes a departure from absolutism and may represent the foundation of a more liberal 
political order in the future. From the perspective of transitology, Kuwait is currently at an 
advanced stage of liberalization and regime opposition, which has demonstrated a willingness 
and ability to work with the monarchy, can be characterized as moderate. Bowever, the most 
important and precipitous variable according to transitology, the schism within the elite, remains 
absent. Bence, democratization is still not imminent. 
4.3 Saudi Arabia 
4.3.1 Overview, History and Past Liberalization 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabi a, also located in the Persian Gulf, covers an area of 
2,149,690 square kilometres. As a result of its central location and its relatively large size, it 
neighbours an extensive list of countries inc1uding Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 'UAE, and 
Yemen and is attached to Bahrain by the King Fahd Causeway. It is also more populous than the 
other Gulf States with its population numbering 27.6 million, inc1uding an additional 5.5 million 
foreign nationals who constitute a major portion of the Saudi labour force. The population 
continues to exp and at an annual rate of 2.06%.295 Saudi Arabia is the world's largest exporter of 
petroleum and possesses 25% of the world's known oil reserves. As a result its economy is 
primarily oil-based. Various estimates have placed the unemployment level anywhere between 
13% and as high as 25%.296 The Saudi Arabian literacy is low in comparison to the other Gulf 
States at 78.8%. The majority of the population is Wahhabi, however there exists a Shi'i 
minority which accounts for 8% of the population. 
The rise of the Al Saud dates back to the birth of Wahhabism. Its founder, Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud, the ruler of a small desert 
295 Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA - The W orld F actbook - Saudi Ara bia", June 12 tb 2007 
https:/ /www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html 
296 Ibid. 
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oasis in central Arabia to create the Saudi state in 1744?97 It was only at the tum of the 20th 
Century under Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud however that the CUITent Saudi Arabian state began to take 
shape?98 The religious establishment however remains a pillar of Saudi society to which the Al 
Saud have allied themselves to legitimize their rule?99 
Present-day Saudi Arabia is one of the most totalitarian regimes in the world. A Saudi 
Prince was famously quoted as having proclaimed that "he who raises his head, his nose shall we 
hammer.,,3ooThe consequences of dissent are such that public opposition in Saudi Arabia is 
understandably subdued. In such a closed society, as Rubin argues, the only area where public 
expression is tolerated is within the religious establishment. Thus, while the Al Saud have 
afforded the re1igious establishment significant clout within the Kingdom, the Wahhabi clerics 
have in recent years bitten the proverbial hand that feeds them. 
In 1979, the Saudi govemment was blindsided when Juhayman al-Utaybi and his 
followers seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca.301 The govemment ordered a military offensive to 
end the rebellion however it proved to be a complicated operation since a significant segment of 
the security force and the military shared the same tribal affiliations as the rebe1s. Thus, they 
either refused outright the orders to storm the mosque or did so re1uctantly. While the Al Saud 
had undoubtedly played' a role in the emergence and spread of Wahhabism within the state, this 
only served to reinforce the dedication of its followers to religion and did not translate to support 
of the Saudi state. Islamic piety did not translate into support for the ruling family or guard them 
against any re1igious opposition, something which the govemment had wrongly presumed. They 
could still be accused by Islamist radicals for not being Islamic enough. 
297 Wahhabism is a Sunni sect which emphasizes a rededication and strict interpretation of the basic tenets of Islam. 
298 N akash, 18 
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301 Ibid., 170. It is worth noting that the recent events which transpired at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, Pakistan in 
July 2007 bear a stunning resemblance to the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque. Utaybi also had the support of 
sorne members within the Saudi ruling family. 
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Another volley of public opposition towards the regime by Islamists occurred in 1991 
when a group of Saudi Arabia's leading clerics (ulemas) sent a detailed petition to the 
govemment calling for the handover of the control of the state to the religious establishment. As 
in J 979, the govemment reacted quickly and dismissed the cl eri cs. More recently, Islamic 
extremism has escalated into violence. The most severe event occurred in May of 2003, when a 
bomb was set otT in a residential compound in Riyadh killing thirty-four and injuring several 
hundred. The American presence in Saudi Arabia has been a source of discontent for Islamic 
militants. Kéchichian argues that recent public declarations by high-ranking Al Saud family 
indicating a re-thinking of the Kingdom's close relationship with the United States is evidence 
that the Islamists are becoming stronger and that the govemment is trying to repaîr its "battered 
legitimacy".302 
The Al Saud however have never hesitated to reprimand the country's cIerics when they 
have become too critical and remind them of the domestic ruling hierarchy. Following the 
Riyadh bombings, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz promised to " confront and destroy the threat 
posed by a deviant few.,,303 A crack-down on militants, sorne with connections to al-Qaeda, 
ensued. They were rounded up and arrested. The King also obliged senior clerics to tone down 
their rhetoric and cease issuing fatwas (religious decrees) which fan the flames of domestic 
extremism. Kéchichian argues that the public denunciation of violence against non-Muslims by 
senior Saudi clerics was the result of pressure placed upon the religious establishment by the Al 
Saud.304 Indeed, while the religious establishment has at times emerged as an opponent, the Al 
Saud have always remained finnly in control and their regime has never been in serious peril. 
302 Joseph A. Kéchichian, "Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the GCC", Middle East 
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On the few occasions where Al Saud have felt mildly threatened and wished to shore up 
public support, it has implemented minor measures in an attempt to give the appearance of 
reform. These have usually consisted of the creation of majlis al-shuras, appointed consultative 
councils. Herb points out that the regime reacted in this manner following the revolution in 
Yemen in 1962, the accession of Khalid to the throne in 1975, the Grand Mosque crisis in 1979 
and Fahd's accession in 1982.305 After the petition of 1991, the government passed the Basic Law 
of Government in 1992 which created a national majlis al-shura first promised in 1927. The body 
is comprised of one hundred and fi ft y members appointed by the King for four year terms.306 
Herb argues that while the new majlis al-shura's influence on policy is marginal it is useful to the 
Al Saud in a number of ways. It enables the monarchy to receive feedback and maintain a 
dialogue with its population and it can be marketed to both Islamists and liberals as evidence of 
political change. In January of 2005, the government announced that the council would be 
increased from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fi ft y members as part of the "dawn 
of a new political era." 307 
Another tactic which the Al Saud have gladly employed to appease discontent within the 
religious establishment is the repression of liberals, an approach employed by many other Arab 
authoritarian regimes.308 The same tactic also explains their mistreatment of the Shi'a. 
Discrimination against the Shi'a has been a feature of Saudi role since Ibn Saud defeated the 
Ottomans and conquered the mainly Shi'i areas of Hasa and Qatif in 1913. The Shi'a of Hasa 
and Qatifhad an agreement with Ibn Saud which exchanged their acquiescence of Saudi role for 
a guarantee of religious freedom. Ibn Saud however did not honour this commitment. The 
conque st of Hasa and Qatif has been recounted by the Al Saud as the "liberation" of Arabs, 
305 Herb 169 
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another success in Ibn Saud's quest to unify Islam.309 Ibn Saud is glorified by the Al Saud as an 
Arab hero in the line ofthe Prophet Muhammad and Saladin, and his conquest ofHasa and Qatif 
presented as "holy war against Shi'i heretics" in cahoots with "foreign imperialists".310 The 
Wahhabi establishment's virulent hatred of the Shi'a derives from their belief that they are 
infidels.311 
However, when oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia, the major reserves were located in 
the areas inhabited by the Shi'a. Like in Bahrain, the Shi'a became an integral part of the 
workforce in the oil industry. Their attempts to secure better working conditions through strikes 
in 1944, 1953, 1956 and 1967 did not pay any dividends but caused a change in hiring 
practices.312 Overall, despite their location, the Shi'a of Saudi Arabia havè not reaped any 
rewards from the oil boom. The Al Saud have excluded the Shi'a from both positions in society 
and their patronage network and continue to view them with suspicion as a security threat. 
The !ranian revolution only made matters worse for the Saudi Shi'a. They faced a 
renewed wave of unprecedented discrimination. In a vicious attempt to destroy their identity and 
isolate them even further, the govemment outlawed certain common Shi'i names for newboms 
and the Wahhabi establishment decreed that Muslims should avoid contact with Shi'i 
individuals.3\3 The status of Saudi Shi'a as second-class citizens and the religious character of 
the Saudi state has led them to support through the years the various different political ideologies 
which advocated change including communism, the Ba'th movement and Arab nationalism.314 
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Not surprisingly, Saudi Shi'a have been watching the developments III Iraq following the 
American intervention attentively. 
Despite such systemic discrimination, the Saudi Shi' a may take solace in several recent 
minor political developments which provide reason for optimism. In 2003, after a series of 
petitions by Saudi refonners demanding an independent judiciary, human rights, constitutional 
refonns, the creation of an elected council and freedom of expression, King Abdallah announced 
the opening of a 'national dialogue". 315 At the behest of the crown prince, conferences were held 
in December 2003, June 2004 and September 2004 to discuss political issues and refonn. 
The debate during these conferences was productive and surprisingly open and frank and 
attendees represented aIl segments of the Saudi population including Shi'a and women. 316 While 
sorne refonners advocated power-sharing, none challenged the monarchy' s legitimacy. This may 
have been the by product of a cautious and perhaps intelligent decision of a group of individuals 
wishing to avoid arrest; it may also represent a genuine desire to adopt refonns within the current 
political structure as has been the preference of the opposition movements in Bahrain and 
Kuwait. The participants for the most part also did not oppose the preservation of Saudi Arabia's 
religious affiliation although diminishing the power of the clerics was a recurring theme.317 In 
the aftennath of the conference, the Saudi govetnment announced that half of aIl municipal 
council members would be elected. The elections were held throughout 2005 across the country 
with the franchise restricted to males. 
4.3.2 Assessing Saudi Prospects for Democratization through the 
paradigms of Modernization, Political Culture and Transitology 
Saudi Arabia's economic indicators suggest a relatively modem society. While its per 
capita income of $13,825 is less than that of Bahrain and Kuwait, Hunter and Malik still consider 
315 Kéchichian, 47 
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it to be a "high income state".318Saudi Arabia like the majority of its Gulf counterparts 
industrialized following the discovery of vast oil resources. While its urbanization was not 
initially as rapid and pronounced as that of Bahrain and Kuwait's, it is still at 58.4% in 1975 and 
has since risen to 81 %.319 It falls only slightly behind both states in education although somewhat 
surprisingly scores a GPI of 1.320 
However, despite these positive economic indicators, Saudi Arabia remains a totalitarian 
state. Reforms in Kuwait and Bahrain can therefore be comparatively viewed as significant 
accomplishments. There has been virtually no liberalization in Saudi Arabia and at most, the 
process is in its infancy as civil and human rights remain elusive and political participation does 
not extend past the local level. Saudi Arabia remains a closed society, its population is closely 
monitored and controlled and public dissent remains illegal. 
The level of dissent in Saudi Arabia is hard to quantify, as is often the case in repressive 
states. The only vocal opposition to the Al Saud has come from the Wahhabi establishment 
which can hardly be classified as moderate. They do not seek liberal reforms but rather the 
installation of a more conservative order. While petitions and the reform conferences held in 
2003 and 2004 have revealed that liberal reformers exist within Saudi Arabi a, they are by no 
means an established group. They are attacked from both sides of the spectrum, by the 
government for expressing dissent and by the Islamists who view them as traitors with foreign 
imperialist ideas. Aside from the seizure of the Great Mosque, Islamist opposition to the 
government has not filtered through to other sectors of the population. Even the handful of 
318 Hunter and Malik, 3 
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visible liberals has not challenged the monarchy in proposing their reforms. The fact that they've 
ended up in jail anyways is indicative of the strength of the Al Saud. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, economic modemization has not resulted in the emergence of 
new social structures. The absence of a developed civic culture is notable and appears to extend 
beyond the ruling elite to the general population. Thus, the modemization and political culture 
paradigms would appear to provide valid explanations for the failure of Saudi Arabia to 
democratize. In fact, Saudi Arabia's dual claim as the Gulf State with the closest association to 
Islam and the most totalitarian regime might lead academics such as Huntington and Kamrava to 
designate it as an example where Islam is the impediment to substantive liberalization. This 
however would be a faulty assumption in light of the pervasiveness of Islam throughout the 
region. The claim that Islam constitutes an impediment to social change is also belied by the 
advanced liberalization pro cesses in Bahrain and Kuwait. 
In the case of Saudi Arabi a, the modemization and political culture models cannot be 
refuted as we have contended in the previous cases of Kuwait and Bahrain. One could reasonably 
argue that missing socio-cultural prerequisites explain the stability of the authoritarian regime in 
Saudi Arabia. The apparent usefulness of the modemization and political culture paradigms in 
analysing the Saudi case does not eliminate the applicability of transitology which retains its 
relevance and provides its own explanation for the endurance of the Saudi monarchy. 
Unlike Bahrain there currently exists no schism within the ruling Al Saud family in Saudi 
Arabia.321 Its oil resources remain vast and thus the Al Saud have retained their tinancial 
independence from society, keeping in touch with its population by using the majli al-shura 
system as a way of collecting information. The unit y of the ruling family combined with its 
321 After issues emerged around succession, the Al Saud created the Allegiance Institution, composed of Al Saud 
males to elect subsequent Kings through a majority. The body however will not gather until after the Crown Prince's 
reign ends, which considering it has yet to begin, will not happen for a while. While the Al Saud appears to 
presently be united, it can be argued that there was a schism at the time of King Faysal's assassination 
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expansive financial resources make the Saudi Arabian monarchy a strong political unit. The little 
opposition which it does face is easily crushed by the might of its sophisticated security 
apparatus. Similar to the Al Sabah, the CUITent strength of the Al Saud means that it is not 
necessary for it to adopt any substantial changes in policy. Unlike Kuwait there exists no liberal 
tradition and the Al Saud have not proven to be very benevolent leaders. This explains the 
contrasting political climates ofKuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, authors such as Herb, Kéchichian and Nakash point out that while minimal, 
there has been political progress in Saudi Arabia. Continued high levels of unemployment and 
the population growth rate could alter the CUITent political dynamics in Saudi Arabia. At this 
point however, democratization in Saudi Arabia, let alone liberalization remain long-term 
propositions. The Al Saud have changed very little over the years and remain firmly positioned 
as the leaders of the Kingdom and Custodians of the Two Holy Mosques. In Saudi Arabia the 
ruling elite remains united, there currently exists no moderate opposition and liberalization 
process is minimal. According to transitology, democracy at this juncture therefore appears 
unattainable. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The Kuwaiti and Saudi cases provide us with a good understanding of the varied 
spectrum of refonn which has occuITed within the Persian Gulf. In the case of Kuwait, persistent 
moderate pro-democracy opposition movements have achieved considerable gains through a 
measured dialogue with the Al Sabah, who have been willing partners. In both cases, early 
liberalization was rescinded on occasions when the monarchy felt threatened. Today, the 
freedoms which Kuwaiti citizens enjoy rival those achieved by the refonn movement in Bahrain. 
The main distinction between the Kuwaiti and Bahraini experiences are in relation to the 
strength of the CUITent regime. Bahrain's oil-based economy has virtually dried up and the Al 
Khalifa have become heavily reliant on foreign aid. Unemployment, abuses of power and 
discriminatory practices have unified the population under a pro-democratic movement whose 
strength has created a rupture within the ruling elite and have led to far-reaching concessions. In 
the case of Kuwait, the monarchy remains strong and united, buoyed by its continued excessive 
oïl revenues. Unemployment is very low and social services and subsidies have been maintained. 
The impetus for change is thus much weaker as the government is secure in its position and the 
population has no significant grievances against the regime. The rapidly developing situation 
unfolding in Bahrain could result in a sprint towards democracy. If Kuwait is to democratize, its 
joumey will resemble more of a marathon. 
In stark contrast to the advanced liberalization in Bahrain and Kuwait, autocracy in Saudi 
Arabia remains relatively unchanged. Its lucrative oil revenue has enabled the monarchy to 
maintain a tight grip on its population. Demands for refonn have been stifled by strong-ann 
repressive tactics. The only challenge to the monarchy has come from Islamist radicals bent on 
installing a more conservative theocracy. While minimal gains have been achieved, 
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democratization remains an unlikely proposition. The Al Saud have shown no willingness or 
desire to make significant changes. 
In between the two extremes we find the rest of the Gulf States. In Qatar, a liberalization 
process was initiated in 1996 and the freedom of the press, championed by AI-Jazeera, is 
unrivalled in the Arab world. Herb argues that these reforms represent an effort by the monarchy 
to consolidate its rule and guard against eventual opposition. Further reforms were undertaken in 
April 2003, as Qatari citizens voted and passed a new constitution which established a forty-five 
member parliament with thirty elected members. This marked the first time that Qatar had 
extended the franchise to women. 
In the UAE, opposition is minimal and majlis provide sufficient participation to satiate its 
population's demands. Although the monarchy has not faced substantia1 opposition demanding 
reforms, they have nonetheless recently undertaken an economic liberalization process. In Oman, 
the regime is isolated from society and therefore less stable. It has until recently been mired in a 
power-sharing struggle within the ruling family, a pitfall which led to the fall of the Libyan 
monarchy. However, in recent years Oman has undertaken substantial reforms. It has created 
consultative assemblies and more remarkably adopted a Bill of Rights which guarantees freedom 
of press, religion, equality of race and gender and installed an independent judiciary. 322 
While Bahrain's prognosis is the most encouraging, regional developments suggest that the 
winds of change are stirring in the Gulf as a whole. No other state, however, responds to the 
postulates outlined in the theoretical paradigm of transitology like Bahrain which possesses the 
combination of a divided and weakened ruling elite with soft-liners and hard-liners, a moderate 
opposition capable of forming a pact with regime soft-liners and an advanced liberalization. An 
eventual transition however could help embolden reform movements throughout the region and 
result in certain states following the path blazed by Bahrain. 
322 Kéchichian, 43 
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5. Conclusion 
Academic literature addressing democratization has in the past dismissed the impact of 
liberalization efforts in the Middle East as effective significant precursors to democratization. 
Although authoritarian rule has remained the prevailing political model, long-term democratic 
transition through incremental reform in Middle East monarchies offer academics the prospect of 
applying the tenets of theoretical paradigms regarding democratization to political reforms in the 
region. We have argued that the theory of transitology offers the most comprehensive model for 
assessing the political changes implemented by and within the Gulf State monarchies. While the 
sine qua non for any significant political transition according to transitology is unpredictability, 
we have argued that such uncertainty is not culturally or temporally dependent and therefore can 
also apply to the Middle East. 
We have seen that the family-based dynamics of monarchies offer sufficient stability to 
mitigate problems of successions and other internaI difficulties inc1uding maintaining the 
legitimacy of the ruling elite over the populace. Indeed, the Gulf monarchies have shown 
themselves to be sufficiently flexible to act both as mediator and patron of their respective 
societies. Modernized state bureaucracies have allowed the incremental evolution of political 
reform while maintaining strong societal control, inc1uding a targeted welfare distribution 
system, made possible by abundant oil revenues. 
Undoubtedly, the changing realities of the oil-based economies will impact the political 
imperatives faced by the Gulf monarchies and their complex patronage networks. Bahrain's 
experience highlights the policy dilemmas which accompany high unemployment and result in 
overextended budgets which no longer are capable of subsidizing the economy. Unable to easily 
fund the traditional subsidized economy, the regime may well have to resort to increasing 
revenues through taxation or risk losing its population's loyal acquiescence and support. 
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Rather than viewing the increased public discontent with the regimes simply as a path to 
eventual political collapse, the responding incremental reforms implemented in the Gulf state can 
be viewed as a strategie tactic to ensure that protest do es not dispute the legitimacy of the 
monarchy itself. In fact, we believe that since monarchies elsewhere have evolved through 
graduaI top-down liberalization and political reform processes without endangering their ruling 
elite, the Bahrain experience remains positive. Moreover, according to transitology theorists 
O'Donnell and Schmitter, liberalization can escape the ruling regime's control and take on its 
own momentum towards effective democratization. 
Since their conquest of Bahrain, the Al Khalifa have displayed a flexible resilience to 
remain in power. Intemationally, they staved off foreign advances through strategie alliances 
with countries willing to guarantee their safety. Domestically their strategy, like the other Gulf 
monarchies and Arab authoritarian regimes in general, has been to introduce political reform in 
times of unrest as a safety valve. The reforms priOf to the late 1990s, in particular the 1973 
parliamentary experiment, were intended to consolidate their rule and stabilize the country rather 
than actually move towards democracy. Once it was clear that the National Assembly would 
curtail the monarchy's power it was quickly dissolved. The impact of the Assembly's dissolution 
was softened considerably by the distraction provided by the oil boom and the Arab Israeli War. 
The govemment's CUITent position is significantly weaker. No longer generating significant oil 
revenue, Bahrain today is heavily reliant on foreign aid from its neighbours. Popular discontent 
is simmering as a result of mounting unemployment, the rise in the cost of living and growing 
poverty. 
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The ascension of the new Emir, Sheikh Hamad, has revealed a division within the 
ruling elite. As has become customary in Bahrain as well as Jordan and Morocco, the 
new Emir's arrivaI coincided with a new set of reforms. The reforms have been 
significant and appear to indicate that the new Emir recognizes that his governrnent can 
no longer stand idle and still survive. Since his ascension, he has negotiated concessions 
which his unc1e and Prime Minister, a steadfast conservative, has staunchly opposed. 
Sheikh Hamad has also made a concerted effort to root out members of the "old guard" as 
much as possible and as a result a rupture appears to have deve10ped within the ruling 
family. 
While instances of governrnent repression towards opposition members has 
diminished significantly, they have not ceased completely. Under the watchful eye of 
international human rights organizations the governrnent appears more cautious. Its arrest 
of Almezel Abdul Hadi al-Khawaja, leader of the Bahraini Centre for Human Rights in 
October 2004 following a lecture in which he criticized the Prime Minister is a good 
illustration. He was arrested and sentenced to one year in prison. His arrest was 
condemned by human rights organizations and demonstrations were held in protests; he 
was pardoned and released within hours.323 Even though Bahrain remains a liberal 
authoritarian regime, any dramatic curtailment of reforms already instituted regarding 
universal suffrage, public participation, freedom of speech and elected assembly would 
represent an even greater threat to the regime since its reduced power would be hard 
pressed to withstand the backlash of any such reversaI. 
323 Rubin, 78 
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Indeed through the prism of the theory of transitology, the current situation in 
Bahrain possesses the perfect storm of political circumstances for a democratic transition: 
a schism within the ruling elite between duros and blandos, an advanced liberalization 
process which has ushered in an extensive repertoire of rights and freedoms and a 
moderate opposition which has shown itself to be a capable partner for the blandos in 
order to reach a political pact based on a negotiated compromise. Detailed empirical 
evidence regarding tensions within ruling elites is often difficult to obtain before a 
transition occurs. Sorne would argue that this precludes transitology from making any 
conclusions with regards to democratization in astate such as Bahrain. However by 
examining the concessions of the ruling elite to demands made by the Bahraini reform 
movement, we can argue that they are wary of their survival. Since this tension has 
resulted in calculated policy changes we are therefore optimistic that Bahrain will 
succeed in making the transition to a constitutional monarchy. 
ln a globalized world, increasingly aware of regional developments, Bahrain's 
liberalization could embolden demands for greater political participation elsewhere in the 
Persian Gulf, as weIl as perhaps within the larger context of the Middle East. It could lead 
to greater pressure on their regimes to reform. While Bahrain is the first Gulf State to 
contemplate life after oil, its neighbours' resources are not unlimited and will one day 
expire and then they will be confronted with the same difficult choices. The ruling 
families of these states therefore also have a marked interest in the developments in 
Bahrain. Considering the climate of reform in the Persian Gulf states aimed at reinforcing 
the ruling monarchies' legitimacy, if successful, the path blazed by Bahrain could 
become the blueprint for other opposition movements in the region. In addition, a 
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successful transition could increase interest from academics to conduct further research 
as to the applicability of transitology to the efforts of liberalization in other states in the 
Middle East. Greater empirical research and insight of internaI regime dynamics would 
strengthen the predictive utility oftransitology within the context of the Middle East. 
113 
- 114 -
Bibliography 
Anderson, Lisa, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East", 
PoUtical Science Quarter/y, Vol. 106, No. 1, Spring, 1991 
Anderson, Lisa, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," Comparative PoUtics 
October 1987 
Andersen, Roy R., Robert F. Seibert and Jon G. Wagner, PoUtics and Change in the 
Middle East: Sources ofConflict and Accommodation, 6th Edition, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 2001 
Annan, Koti, "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights 
for AlI", March 2005, http://www.un.org/largerfreedomlcontents.htm. December 
4,2006 
Ayubi, Nazih, Over-Stating the Arab State: PoUtics and Society in the Middle East. 
London: lB Taurus, 1995 
Bill, James A. and Robert Springborg, PoUtics in the Middle East. New York: Addison 
Wesley Longman, 2000 
Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van De Walle, Democratie Experiments in Africa. 
Cambridge University Press, 2002 
Brynen, Rex, Bahgat Korany, and David Noble, eds., PoUtical LiberaUzation and 
Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical Perspectives. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995 
Bunce, Valerie, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations", 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 33, No. 6-7, September 2000 
Carothers, Thomas and Marina, Ottaway eds. Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy 
in the Middle East. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2005 
Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA - The World Factbook - Bahrain", June 12 2007, 
https://www .cia. gov /library/pubIications/the-worl d -factbook/ geos/ba.html #Govt 
Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA - The W orld Factbook - Kuwait", June 12 2007, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ku.html 
Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA - The World Factbook - Saudi Arabia", June 12 
2007, https://www.cia.gov/librarylpublications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html 
Cox, Robert with Michael G., Shechter, The PoUtical Economy of a Plural Word: 
114 
- 115 -
Critical Reflections on Power, Morais and Civilization, London: Routledge, 2002 
Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner and Daniel Brumberg, eds., Islam and Democracy in 
the Middle East. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003 
Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence ofDemocracy, 
Second Edition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996 
Dyck, Rand, ed., Studying PoUtics: An Introduction to PoUtical Science. Scarborough: 
Thomas Nelson, 2002 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, "The Democratization Process in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council Countries", Journal of Social Affairs, vol. 222, no. 86, pp. 55-69, 
Summer2005 
Eickelman, Dale and James Piscatori, MusUm PoUtics. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004 
Entelis, John ed., Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997 
Esposito, John L. and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam", Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer 1991 
Esposito, John L. ed., PoUtical Islam: Revolution, RadicaUsm or Reform? Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1997 
Federal Research Division, Bahrain. Kessinger Publishing, 2005 
Freedom House, "New Study Details Islamic World's Democracy Deficit", Dec. 18 
2001, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1 01, Dec. 
12,2006 
Gause III, F. Gregory, Gil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab 
Gulf States, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994 
Graz, Liesl, The Turbulent Gulf. London: LB. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1990 
Handelman, and Mark TessIer, eds., Democracy and Its Limits: Lessons from Asia, Latin 
America, and the Middle East. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1999 
Herb, Michael, Ali in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle 
Eastern Monarchies. Albany: SUNY Press, 1999 
Herb, Michael, "Islamist Movements and the Problem of Democracy in the Arab World", 
115 
- 116 -
paper delivered to the MESA annual conference, November 2005, 
http://www2.gsu.eduJ~polmfhlherb democracy islam.pdf, Dec. 13, 2006 
Herb, Michael, "Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World," Middle East Journal 58, 3, 
Summer 2004 
Holger, Albrecht and Oliver, Schlumberger, "Waiting for Godot: Regime Change without 
Democratization in the Middle East", International Political Science Review, Vol. 
25, No. 4, Oct. 2004 
Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John D. Stephens, "The Impact of 
Economie Development on Democracy", The Journal of Economie Perspectives, 
Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer, 1993) 
Hudson, Michael, Arab PoUlies: The Searchfor Legitimacy. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1977 
Hunter, Shireen T. and Huma Malik, Modernization, Democracy and Islam, London: 
Praeger, 2005 
Huntington, Samuel P., "After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave", Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1997 
Huntington, Samuel P., PoUtical Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968 
Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Nonnan: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups", International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, VoL 12, No. 4, December 1980 
International Cri sis Group, "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge", International Crisis Group 
Middle East Report, no. 40, May 6, 2005 
Karnrava, Mehran, Democracy in the Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle East, 
New York: Chatham House Publishers, 1998 
Kamrava, Mehran, PoUtics and Society in the Third World, London: Routledge, 1993 
Karnrava, Mehran, PoUlies and Society in the DevelopingWorld 2nd Edition, London: 
Routledge, 2000 
Karstedt, Susanne, "Democracy, Values, and Violence: Paradoxes, Tensions, and 
Comparative Advantages of Liberal Inclusion" The Annals of The American 
Academy ofPoUtical And Social Science, voL 605, no. 1, May 2006 
116 
- 117 -
Kéchichian, Joseph A., "Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to 
the GCC", Middle East Policy, vol. Il, no. 4, Win ter 2004 
Khalaf, Abdullhadi, "The King's Dilemma: Obstacles to Political Reform in Bahrain", 
Paper delivered to the Fourth Mediterranean Social and Political Meeting, March 
2003, http://www.iue.itIRSCASlRestrictedPapers/conmed2003free/200303Khalaf05.pdf, 
Jan. 28,2007 
Kostiner, Joseph ed., Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000 
Kramer, Martin, Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in 
America. Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001 
Kelly, J.B., Arabia, the Gulf & the West. London: George Weidenfeld and Nicholson 
Limited, 1980 
Kugler, Jacek and Yi, Feng, "Explaining and Modeling Democratic Transitions", The 
Journal ofConflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 2, Apr. 1999 
Lipset, Seymour Martin, "Sorne Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy", American Political Science Review, vol. 
53,no. l, 1959 
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Jason M. Lakin, The Democratie Century. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2004 
Lipset, Seymour Martin, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. l, Feb., 1994 
Mansur, Salim, "Review: Ali in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in 
the Middle East Monarchies by Michael Herb", Canadian Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 33, No. 4, Dec., 2000 
McKnight, Sean, Neil, Partrick and Francis, Toase eds. GulfSecurity: Opportunities and 
Challenges for the New Generation, London: Royal United Services Institute for 
Defence Studies and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2000 
Ménard, Jean-François, ed. États d'Afrique noire :formation, mécanismes et crises, 
Paris: Karthala, 1991 
Merkel, Wolfgang, "Embedded and Defective Democracies", Democratization, Vol. Il, 
5,2004 
Mohammed, Nadeya Sayed Ali, Population and Development in the Arab Gulf States: 
The Case of Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003 
117 
- 118 -
Nakash, Yitzhak, Reachingfor Power: The Shi 'a in the Modern Arab World. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006 
Nazir, Sameena and Leigh, Tomppert eds. Women 's Rights in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Citizenship and Justice. New York: Freedom House, 2005 
Niethammer, Katja, "Voices in Parliament, Debates in MajaUs and Banners on Streets: 
avenues ofPolitical Participation in Bahrain", European University Institute 
Working Papers, No. 27, 2006 
Nonneman. Gerd, "Rentiers and Autocrats, Monarchs and Democrats, State and Society: 
The Middle East between Globalization, Human 'Agency' and Europe", 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International affairs 1944-), Vol. 77, 
No.l, Jan., 2001 
Nun, Jose, "Democracy and Modernization, Thirty Years Later", Latin American 
Perspectives, Vol. 20, No. 4, Autumn, 1993 
O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986 
Pellas, Martin, "Bahrain: The Royals Rule, Le Monde Diplomatique, March 2005 
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, 
Democracy and Development: PoUtical Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 
1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 
Rahbek, Birgitte ed. Democratisation in the Middle East: Dilemmas and Perspectives. 
Aarhus University Press, 2005 
Remmer, Karen L., "Review: New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization", 
Comparative PoUtics, Vol. 28, No. 1, Oct., 1995 
Rubin, Barry, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the 
Middle East. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2006 
Russett, Bruce, Grasping the Democratie Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993 
Rustow, Dankwart A., "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Mode}", 
Comparative PoUtics, Vol. 2, No. 3, Apr. 1970 
Sadiki, Larbi, "Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization", International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1., Feb., 2000 
118 
- 119 -
Said, Edward, Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979 
Saikal, Amin and Albrecht Schnabel, Demoeratization in the Middle East: Experiences, 
Struggles, Challenges. New York: United Nations Press, 2003 
Shapiro, Ian, The State of Democratie Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003 
Sharabi, Hisham, Neopatriarehy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988 
Sick, Gary G. and Lawrence G., Potter eds. The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays 
in Polities, Eeonomy, Seeurity and Religion. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997 
United Nations Development Programme, "Hum an Development Report 2006 - Beyond 
Scarcity: Power, Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis - Bahrain", August 12007, 
http://hdr.undp.orglhdr2006/statistics/countries/data sheets/cty ds BHR.html, 
August 1 2007 
United Nations Development Programme, "Hum an Development Report 2006 - Beyond 
Scarcity: Power, Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis - Kuwait", August 1 2007, 
http://hdr.undp.orglhdr2006/statistics/countries/data sheets/ ct Y ds K WT .html, 
August 1 2007 
United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 2006 - Beyond 
Scarcity: Power, Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis - Saudi Arabia", August 1 
2007 ,http://hdr.undp.orglhdr2006/statistics/countries/data sheets/cty ds SAU .ht 
ml, August 1 2007 
United States Department ofState, "Bahrain (03/07)", June 122007, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26414.htm 
Tachau, Frank, "Review of Democracy in the Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle 
East by Mehran Karnrava", The Journal o/Polities, Vol. 62, No. 1, Feb., 2000 
Waterbury, John, "Fortuitous By-Products", Comparative Polities, Vol. 29, No. 3, 
Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow, 
Apr.1997 
Waldner, David, State Building and Late Development. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1999 
Whitehead, Laurence Demoeratization: Theory and Praetice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002 
World Bank, "Bahrain At a Glance", September 19 2005, 
119 
- 120-
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAGlbhr aag.pdf, July 27 2007 
World Bank, "Bahrain Data Profile", July 30 2007, 
http:// devdata. worldbank.org/extemal/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP &CCODE= BHR 
July 302007 
World Bank, "Key Development Data & Statisties", July 222007, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITEIEXTERNALIDATASTATISTICS/O,,eontent 
MDK:20535285~menuPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150-piPK:64133175~theSite 
PK:239419,00.html July 26 2007 
World Bank, "Kuwait At a Glanee", September 192005, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/sau aag.pdf, July 27 2007 
Wotld Bank, "Kuwait Data Profile", July 31 2007, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/extemal/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=KW 
I, July31 2007 
World Bank, "Saudi Arabia At a Glanee", September 19 2005, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/sau aag.pdf, July 27 2007 
Wright, Steven, "Generational change and Elite-driven reforms in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain", Durham Middle East Pa pers, No. 81, June 2006 
Zahlan, Rosemarie Said, The Making of the modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, 
the United Arab Emirates and Oman 2nd Edition. Ithaea: Ithaea Press, 1998 
120 
